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In the course of the last few years the main attributes of
the conscripted sailors summoned to serve their compulsary time
in the Royal Norwegian Navy have changed substantially, es-
pecially regarding level of education and attitudes toward
formal authority. Similar developments have taken place in the
Norwegian society at large during this period while the mission
of the Navy has remained approximately the same.
This study describes and discusses various approaches a
commanding officer of a frigate in the RNoN could choose to
establish an effective unit under present individual and societal
circumstances; the difficulties he is likely to experience and
decisions he has to make, when attempting to adjust traditional
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Since the mid-60' s a substantial change has taken place in
Norwegian society with regard to many inherited values whose
function and purpose were never questioned in earlier days.
Traditionally, persons in formal positions were respected and
often feared for their authority and the administrative powers
they held. However, the attack on formal authority in general
and the introduction of ombudsmen have brought about a strong
decline in the respect for and hence the power of holders of
administrative positions. For the military establishment, this
means that those in superior positions are also being evaluated
and judged on merit by their followers. For those who do not
have the professional skills and leadership ability required
to be accepted as the natural leader, formal position is viewed
as being of limited value as a platform from which to lead
effectively if respect and confidence in the leader are lacking.
Blind obedience to orders given by such a person can no longer
be relied upon as a substitute for proper leadership qualifica-
tions. These trends have forced Naval officers to change or
T27l
adjust traditional patterns of their leadership styler J
When making programs or determining sources of action much more
serious consideration has to be given to welfare factors and
regulations than previously. Some of these changes have been
formally established through Navy regulations. They are often
11

based upon negotiated agreements between representatives of
officers, enlisted personnel, and the Government.
The conscripted men also have their elected representa-
tives at local and central levels to take care of their
interests, but they have no negotiating rights. J In addi-
tion, an independent ombudsman guarantees administrative
fairness and equal treatment to all categories of personnel.
He reports directly to the parliament.
In many cases the different representatives have a formal
right to be consulted in administrative matters. This some-
times provides better input but from the officer's point of
view at least, quite frequently it requires far more time and
resources than the problem deserves in terms of efficiency.
Besides, more rigorous administrative requirements could
lead to a strengthening of bureaucratic tendencies and a weak-
ening in the utilization of initiative that is encouraged in
the personal development of the individual officers of the
Navy. This is quite a serious effect since bureaucratic minds
are not noted for forceful and innovative leadership which
most certainly is needed in time of war. J Preparing for
war, of course, remains the basic mission as always for any
unit commander despite changes in the peacetime environment.
He has to make his best effort to establish and maintain the
highest possible level of fighting preparedness the resources
given to him will allow.
Norway has universal conscription.
12

This task has become more and more difficult and complicated.
Among other reasons this is caused by the fact that his author-
ity is steadily diminishing due to the introduction of more and
more formal structures as described above. On the other hand,
the complexity of military procedures, operations, and mainte-
nance requirements has tended to increase. Hence, the need for
efficient administration and leadership is imperative in order
to realize the potential of men and systems. Furthermore, a
change in the cycle of deployment of Navy units has recently
been imposed. For years a three-month workup period began the
cycle when the new contingent of drafted personnel arrived after
having completed their basic military and system training. For
the following nine months , the unit remained in operative status
until a new crew arrived, and the cycle started all over again.
In order to extend the period of operative deployment, a
new policy has been adopted. Officers and enlisted men are kept
usually for one to three years , while one-fourth of the drafted
personnel are replaced every third month. This scheme, of
course, requires a completely different approach to the planning
and conduct of training cycles than heretofore. In order to
meet these challenges the Royal Norwegian Navy has carried out
a program of seminars for all categories of Naval officers. J
The subjects include group behaviour and organizational and
communication theory. A follow-up program in organizational
development has also been given to selected groups of officers.
At the same time the required courses in these fields have been
increased substantially at the Navy's educational establishments.
13

However, most of these programs have been given in the
terminology of the university scientist or in the context and
language of private enterprise. This fact has left considera-
ble confusion among participants. Officers are feeling insecure
about integrating their acquired human behaviour concepts with
the practices of traditional Navy leadership as they have
learned it. In other words, the officers of the Navy are in
a transient state of adjusting their customary leadership style
towards new schemes that are thought to be better suited to
help leaders deal with current challenges efficiently.
In this situation it is of importance to recognize that
values and customs change continuously in a society. However,
rigid structured organizations, such as the military, often
have a limxted ability to respond to outside developments. J
When the gap between the surrounding society and practices
within the military grows too far apart, an adjustment has to
T53ltake place. J In order to avoid painful, disruptive steps,
the military has to learn to be more observant and responsive.
The faster the environment changes, the more flexibility is
required towards rapid responses to avoid unnecessary conflicts
and agony. As tension builds up, outside interference is
almost certain to be experienced if the Navy fails to respond
adequately. Imposed regulations will create uneasiness among
the professionals of the Navy and will probably reduce the
level of performance, at least temporarily. At the same time,
there is always the danger of reduced rights to self-determination
in internal matters when lack of ability to handle the situation
14

is demonstrated. On the contrary, if the Navy can prove to
have the necessary awareness, well planned and gradual imple-





A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The purpose of any Navy unit is to obtain and maintain the
highest possible level of combat readiness. To reach this goal
is a complicated task with many interrelated variables to be
considered. To be successful, it is necessary to design a
sociotechnical system that meets both the organizational re-
quirements as well as the needs of the individuals in the most
1*19 25l
optimal way. ' J Fortunately, considerable knowledge is
now available that may facilitate the task and possibly make
it easier to obtain satisfactory results if the insight is
utilized properly.
In this study our point of view will be that of the
Commanding Officer (CO) . This approach seems quite natural
since the ultimate responsibility always rests with the CO,
formally and morally.^ 31, PP- 308
"312
?
49 1 Hence, the objective
is to propose models within which it is possible for a
Commanding Officer of a Navy vessel to understand his unit in
terms of main variables and their important interactions. This
would better enable him to systematically experiment with situ-
ational variables by applying social sciences knowledge and
proven administrative techniques in combination with the tradi-
T49ltional experiences of the Royal Norwegian Navy
.
u J The aim is
to recognize structures that might help the CO to evaluate
situational variables as accurately and realistically as possible.
16

More profound understanding of which factors at play are likely
to be the important ones should increase his awareness and
enable him to find adequate means within the frame of his
authority to maintain and improve output.
Since the technical system of a specific type of warship
is given as fixed and the output requirements change very little
over a few years, the fighting unit is described by a yearly
cycle. Once each year the main bulk of the crew will be
relieved. New officers and men arrive and basic training has
to start all over again. It is common to state objectives,
plan exercises, and evaluate performance in terms of time
elapsed since the major portion of a ship's crew arrived. This
measurement could be called crew maturity and the unit is usu-
ally a month. Main variables in each phase do not vary too
much from year to year except for the personalities involved.
In the first weeks for example, quite a few of the "freshmen"
will experience difficulty in adjusting to the warship environ-
ment. Other phases create different problems.
Systematic attempts to identify significant variables , and
possibly classify their relative importance in various situa-
tions and phases, could provide a useful analytical tool for
the CO in his diagnostic efforts. The main objective of this
study is to try to establish a meaningful structural frame for
such discussions. However, due to the variance in personality,
values, style, and ability in different circumstances of the
T191 .
various leaders as well as that of their group, J it is more
than doubtful that any type of close to controlled experiments
17

can be carried out. " It should also be stressed that it is
hard to develop normative rules that can accomplish much more
than to recommend that the CO is aware of and alert to certain
indications in areas which are commonly known to cause problems.
The number of variables and complexity of interactions prevent
the establishment of "correct" solutions. Optimality often has
to be found by weighing the need for a technical "best" solution
against the necessity of acceptance when considering the imple-
[521
mentation phase. J Realistically, the most to be hoped for
is that more valuable learning will result from experiments
when a reference is available in the form of a theoretical model.
Furthermore, the vessel itself can be viewed as a physical model.
In addition all activities and variables can be looked upon as
events and attributes, respectively, in an identity simulation
of the actual model. In summary, the CO's problem is (1) to
observe results and interpret their significance (which is not
an easy task when using identity simulation) and (2) to utilize
the insights gained to improve output.
B . ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout the study a frigate will be the unit to be
modelled. All discussions have to be understood in the context
of this reference. Based on that and the considerations given
above in section A, the following assumptions will be made:
1. The frigate as a technological system is given. This
means that shortcomings in design of man-machine systems such
18

as lack of compliance with human factor principles will not be
considered.
2. Identity simulations are always carried out on a man
of war. * Successful experiments are repeated and knowledge
of such results are passed on and finally written down in the
T49l
Navy Regulations (NAVREG) as guidance to be followed. 1- J
Hence, in the Navy context many of these recommendations ought
to reflect sociological axioms.
3. Maximum efficiency occurs when the satisfaction of indi-
vidual needs are not in conflict with the requirements to fulfill
Tl9lthe organizational goals of the frigate. J
C. OUTLINE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
This study is based upon the assumption that the CO "can be
viewed as a person in charge of a real life simulation experi-
ment which in the simulation theory is called an identity simu-
lation. J The study will be done by literature research in
combination with the application of the author's experience.
The analysis will be conducted as follows
:
1. Background Factors
Attributes of the main social categories and their sub-
systems are discussed. Next, the formal structure of the frigate




2. Modelling the Frigate
First a system levels model is used, secondly a socio-
technical system is described.
3. Applying Additional Theoretical Support
Selected areas of communication and leadership theory
will be briefly discussed. Examples of how such knowledge can
be applied will be given. Furthermore, models of the goal and
decision processes will be presented. In addition, the prospects
of participation will be discussed with reference to the rigidity
of required organizational structure in various readiness situa-
tions. Finally, a model of the use of educational goals will be
considered in the organizational context of management by ob-
jectives.
4. Time-Based Analysis
On a chronological basis, the models and discussions
presented earlier will be used to identify and describe varia-
bles regarded to be of particular importance at each phase of
crew maturity. Based upon the analysis and recommendations
found in the NAVREG and considered to apply to the situation,
some normative suggestions will be put forward,
5. Summary and Conclusions
A broad overview of the most important considerations




An appendix will be supplied comparing the usefulness
of the two leadership models utilized most in this study. The




III. ANALYSIS OF THE FRIGATE AS A SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND FACTORS
When starting to discuss and analyze the variables of the
model as a man-machine system it is necessary to outline the
factors making up the basic skeleton which has to be taken as
a given for the frigate.
1. Social Groups of the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN)
Onboard a frigate we will roughly have two main cate-
gories of crew members, officers and ratings. Within each of
these some subgroups can be identified.
a. - Officers
The officers may be classified in different ways.
From a potential conflict of interest point of view, it is
probably most enlightening first to look at educational back-
ground. Basically, one group is Naval Academy educated. These
officers have completed four years of training at the Academy.
Entry requirements are gymnasium or equivalent (approximately
two years of junior college)
.
L J They are educated and
trained in three distinct specialties: line, engineering, and
supply, and they serve in accordance with these designators
throughout their Navy career. -1 However, the line officers
specialize further by so-called "long-courses" (six to nine
22

month duration) into gunnery, antisubmarine warfare, communi-
cation, etc. There is also some specialization through service
experience, such as being primarily a frigate man, a submariner,
a mine-warefare expert, etc. However, most officers serve at
least in two different types of ships such that a submariner
usually also will serve on frigates sooner or later.
There is also another type of officer coming from the
Naval Academy. Candidates with Merchant Marine College educa-
tion and graduates of Technical Colleges and other schools with
science curricula are given a short, one-year, officer candidate
type training before being commissioned as reserve officers.
College graduates may later qualify for career status. The
Commanding Officer (CO) of a frigate, and sometimes the
Executive Officer (XO) , will usually be a War College graduate
as well.
The other group of officers are those who until the
previous year were the petty-officers. They are graduates of
the Sea Military College. Minimum entry requirements vary
from specialty to specialty, but gymnasium is not necessary.
Depending on educational and vocational background, the basic
training lasts two to three years before becoming a non-
commissioned reserve officer in one of the seventeen different
branches. J Those who are qualified may apply for the upper
level course which lasts approximately two years. For most
branches, the students enroll for the two last years at three-
year technical colleges. Upon graduation they are commissioned
as ensigns and become members of the technical officer corps.
23

Besides being responsible for maintenance and repair of their
equipment, they are also highly trained operators within their
field of specialty.
Some unrest has followed the change of rank for the
technical officers. Younger Naval Academy officers have seen
their traditional status and power-positions being threatened
by this development. As a result, all officers now receive
orders from the Navy headquarters to a specific job or posi-
tion. In the past, many officers were ordered to a ship and
the CO assigned them to duties at his discretion. -Nothing
much has changed functionally. As before, Naval Academy grad-
uates will usually be the department heads, the technical
officers and junior academy outputs and reserve officers will
serve as division officers. Sometimes, however, the department
head may be junior in rank and seniority to some of his divi-
sion officers. This might be a source of conflict, but more
often than not it works fine and the formal organizational
position, alone, determines command authority. ' J
Senior technical officers will also frequently be department
heads.
The upgrading of the petty officers to officer status
was a political move, but mostly a consequence of the general
trend in the society aiming at tearing down what is regarded
as unnecessary social boundaries. When new ships are con-
structed and living quarters planned in accordance with estab-
lished rules , it is unlikely that this factor will create any




In Norway all men are called for screening exami-
nations for military service at the age of 19. Some 8.5 percent
are found unfit to serve, the rest of the approximately 30,000
is conscripted and about 4000 have to serve 15 months in the
T39l
Navy. J Of those, 2700 qualify for sea duty. According to
the Norwegian constitution it is both a right and a duty to do
military service.
It is a challenge that everybody has to serve since
not all are equally positive towards spending the compulsatory
15 months in uniform. Young people are slightly less favorable
in their attitude towards the military than older people. Hence,
a recent survey (Table I) showed the following opinions among
[211Norwegions regarding perceived need for military defense. J
TABLE I
NORWAY'S NEED FOR MILITARY DEFENSE
All ages 15-19 20-29 30-59 60
In favor 79 64 78 80 81
Against 7 11 9 7 5
Don't Know 8 12 7 8 8
No opinion 6 13 5 6 7
Another gallup conducted within and by the military
services compared the expectations of screening candidates
towards their military service with the attitudes and opinions
of recruits and veterans, respectively. The data was collected
25

in 1966/1967. A tremendous amount of change has taken place
since then within the military, so the results may not apply
very well to the present situation. However, some conclusions
are found to be interesting and will be mentioned:
- approximately 48% looked forward to do their
military service as opposed to 13% that were
really worried.
- 65% said they would do their best, 3% intended
to do the least possible.
- 37% of the recruits liked the military service
quite well as opposed to 21% of the veterans.
38% of the recruits had no strong opinion.
35% of veterans had the same meaning.
- 28% stated that they liked themselves better
than expected, 40% as they had anticipated,
the rest worse than they had thought.
- 10% indicated that they had serious difficulty
in adjusting to the military environment, 39%
had experienced some problems, the rest none.
- 95% said they enjoyed being with their buddies
and 57% liked their officers quite well.
- ability to adjust to the military environment
and find satisfaction in the service increased
significantly with level of education.
Since 1967, the developments in the educational
sector have been explosive. Secondary, vocational, college,
and university training have increased substantially. Likewise,
goals and methods have been adjusted to meet the challenge of
such reforms as that of the Industrial Democracy Act (which
requires and guarantees workers to be represented by elected
members on the board of industries and firms) . To prepare
Internal Armed Forces reports and studies
26

students for such tasks, all categories of schools emphasize
group work and also have a varying number of required social
science courses in their curricula. The implication of this
is that the average soldier is quite educated theoretically
or highly trained vocationally. Besides, many of them have
been on school boards or participated in political or organi-
zational activities . Hence , many Norwegian ratings are quite
used to have a saying in matters concerning their situation
when they enter the military service.
In addition to the conscripted ratings, there is
also a group of volunteers that enlists for a minimum of three
years. At the end of the contract period they may reenlist for
another three years or they can apply for further training to
become technical officers if they qualify. There is also an
option to renew the contract for a third period. These ratings
are quite well paid, and they accumulate a substantial bonus
that is paid in cash when leaving the service or it may be
given as a monthly payment for those enrolling in schools or
colleges. The number of years paid for depends on the time
served. The volunteers also have their own uniforms that are
different from those doing compulsory service. On the average,
the educational level of the men on contract is slightly lower
than that of nonvolunteers who are found fit for sea duty.
However, personnel in this category are very useful. They
provide continuity and a higher level of experience. Therefore,
volunteers are important members of the crew, especially towards
the end of their first period or after reenlistment. The basic
system of training is the same for all in the same specialty,
27

but those on contract often get additional professional educa-
tion later. This is typical if they are in a specialty such
as radar, sonar, and operations. It is also quite common that
the volunteers who have no adjustment problems and take liking
in their occupation, identify more strongly with the Navy as
a serviceman than do ordinary conscripts. Those who cannot
comply are usually discharged before the end of their contracts
They then lose their whole bonus , so they have a strong incen-
tive to stay straight. The volunteers usually constitute a
high status group among the ratings due partly to seniority
and partly as a result of well-filled pocketbooks. Most of
them are single and big spenders during harbor visits.
Not considering the formal groups, status among
ratings is earned through seniority. The veterans (three
months left to serve or less) rule jealously. And they have
no mercy with freshmen who do not comply according to their
norms. Usually, social sanctions are enough to line up most
challengers. However, the veteran rules apply only in certain
situations such as having the best tables for meals, some extra
"goodies" for their sandwiches, the right to join the line in
the front, reserved seats for TV, etc. The formal groups are
more important for developing friendship and identification
and, hence, are a basis for efficiency.
The main input to this section is based upon the author '
s






Some of the main subsystems of the ship have been described.
The social hierarchy includes officers and ratings. The offi-
cers can be subdivided by education into (1) Academy graduates
of 'three main categories and (2) technical officers with more
specialized technical and vocational training in 17 specialties.
Among the ratings the volunteers serve for three years, the con-
scripted for 15 months.
2. The Formal Structure of the Frigate
In classical or bureaucratic terms organizations are
described as hierarchies. A superior has formal or legal au-
thority which he delegates to those of his subordinates reporting
directly to him. In turn they pass authority to their next level
subordinates. This is the type of organizational view that is
called military and associated with a pyramid structure.
When viewed formally, the organization of the frigate, as
seen on a chart mapping the interaction among the functional
groups of the system, fits this model quite well. Certain
aspects of the ship's functional organization will be treated
next.
a. Functional Groups
The functional organization of the frigate is shown















Dept. X Dept. Y
- DIVB2
DIVB3
Figure 1. Functional Organization of the Frigate
The ship is divided into departments under the
Commanding Officer (CO) and the Executive Officer (XO) . For-
mally the department heads report to the XO except in some rare
exceptions. An example of the latter is when the Navigation
Officer reports directly to the CO in matters concerning the
r 49 l
navigation of the ship. 1 J Usually the XO also carries the
extra title "Head of Exercise Planning and Coordination." It
is in the frame of departments and divisions that the basic
training in operation and maintenance of weapons and systems
are planned and conducted. As a rule ratings are assigned to
quarters according to division, and the individuals usually are
identified and referred to as members of their division. Combi-
nations of divisions and departments may also serve as a
30

reference group on occasions. Traditionally, it is the case
that there is a sort of competition or show off between deck
and engine crew members. In interaction with people from other
units or with nonmilitary persons, the ship itself is the main
reference. Sometimes, the unit the ship belongs to, say the
squadron, may be used for identification purposes.
The functional organization is a strict hierarchy,
and as explained before, the organizational position determines
r 29 § 102 4
1
command authority. "'It should also be noted that it
is not uncommon for the XO to be junior to one of his depart-
ment heads, say the engineer. Furthermore, some department
heads may have division officers that are their seniors in rank
as well. However, the most common situation where juniors
command senior officers, happens when relatively young line
officers serve as officers of the watch at sea.
b. Operational Organization
In order to utilize the ship as an integrated
system, there are several different operational organizations.
Which one of them that will be in force depends entirely upon
the situation. When combat action is imminent, the highest
level of readiness, "action stations," is ordered. Then, all
members of the crew are on maximum alert in their prime combat
roles.
The next level is a two watch system. The crew is
r 49 Idivided between the King's and the Queen's watches.
Depending on the mission, all systems are half manned or some
31

systems are fully operated with others only partially activated












Figure 2. Functional Organization of the Frigate - Two Watch
System
As shown on Figure 2 the CO is in command of one watch, the XO
of the other. Most of the time the Officer of the Watch (OOW)
will be in charge and only report intentions to the CO/XO. A
majority of OOW will run the operations from the combat infor-
mation center (CIC) and will have an assistant in control of
safe navigation on the bridge. More often than not the CO/XO
will also stay in the CIC. Under more relaxed circumstances,
a three-watch system will be utilized. The OOW will be in
charge and he will often find it suitable to be on the bridge
with his assistant. If there is a third officer on duty as
assistant to the OOW, he will be in command of the CIC activi-
ties. Ordinarily, no weapons are operated, only detection
systems such as radars, ECM, and sonars are activated. ,
32

Seamanship activities such as boat drills, man-
overboard exercises, emergency rudder procedures, etc., are
trained when the three-watch system is in force. When in harbor
the red, blue, and white watches, as they are named, alternate
as duty watch. Due to work hour regulations, the officers are
not always on post with their watches when secured.
c. The Advisory Board
There is still another formal group of some impor-
tance to be mentioned. It is the advisory board to the Captain,
or directly translated, the Board of Spokesmen. Each department
has its elected member, and the officers have their own repre-
sentative. Formal consulations with the Captain have to be held
at least every fourth night. An agenda is prepared and distributed
before the meetings take place. The non-officer members are
entitled to brief their "constitutency" during work hours after
each meeting. A formal minute is written and a protocol is kept
of the proceedings. A copy of the minute is posted, and other
copies are sent up the chain of command and to some other insti-
tutions including the Ombudsman of the Armed Forces . The rating
representatives elect a main spokesman among themselves. He is
their coordinator and works closely with the XO and/or the CO
to prepare agenda and meetings . He has his own office . Many
XOs also use the board members for informal consultations
specially in matters concerning welfare and sports. The board
has to be consulted or informed before action is taken in certain
administrative areas. In some explicity defined aspects of
33

welfare the board of spokesmen has the right to decide. However,
the CO may veto if he disagrees. Implementation is then tempo-
rarily postponed until the dispute is resolved by competent
authority. If the CO's objections are accepted, the case is
finally overruled. In addition, the regulations encourage the
CO to delegate additional authority to the board in matters he
r 17
1
finds fruitful whenever possible.
Summary
The ship is organized into a functional organization of
departments and divisions for training in the operation of
weapon systems and for maintenance. Operationally, the ship
is divided into watches corresponding to different levels of
readiness.
The Board of Spokesmen is an advisory board to the Captain.
Members are elected on the basis of department representation.
In some specified areas the Board has decision authority or
the right to be informed before action is taken.
3. Other Background Factors
In recent years the importance and influence of the
officer's "unions" have increased substantially. There are
several competing for members . The volunteer ratings also have
the right to organize. Formally, the unions are supposed to
restrict themselves to negotiate salaries and deal with
For a broader, general introduction to naval warship
organization and administration, see: Ship Organiza-
tion and Personnel, Fundamentals of Naval Science,
Naval Institute Press, 1972.
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questions related to working conditions. The latter includes
regulating work hours, establishing standards for quarters, and
health and safety matters.
The Armed Forces in Norway are organizationally inte-
grated at headquarter levels. Hence, regulations that emerge
as a result of negotiations between unions and the Department
of Defense tend to be standard. Since the Army is the largest
service, more often than not it is the model. As a result, the
work hours rules created numerous administrative and operation-
al problems for the efficient running of naval vessels when
they first were introduced. They have since been renegotiated
and are no longer an operational problem per se. But the
compensations that have to be paid for lost free time put a
severe practical limit upon time spent at sea. Under ordinary
peacetime circumstances the consequences are that this economic
constraint effectively curbs any sailing during weekends if it
is not operationally required or if it has not been approved
in advance by higher authority for participation in major
exercises. The ratings conscripted to serve have no right to
organize in unions. But representatives are elected to present
their problems at consultative spokesmen conferences held at
regional and central levels of military commands
.
l J The
basic idea is that information about grievances will emerge,
and that the participants can develop solution alternatives
during group work sessions. It is also an opportunity for
politicians and the press to meet the soldiers and listen to
their debates. An important mission at the annual main con-
ference is to establish priorities among demands . The conferences
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also elect the members of a coordination board that is in
charge between conferences . This board chooses from among
themselves a permanent work group whose members serve at the
Department of Defense on a full time basis.
Even though the conferences, as well as the centrally-
placed coordination board, only have advisory status, their work
group often has lobbied forcefully within the Department of
Defense as well as with members of the Defense Committee in
the parliament. At any rate, a large number of reforms have
been introduced. Welfare improvements in the form of increased
number of paid, long weekend tours home have been granted. A
slow move towards rigid work hour regulations for conscripted
personnel also seems likely to be realized before long. This
tendency has been strengthened through the newly passed
[321
"Environmental Law" which regulates strictly overtime and
nightwork in industry. So far the Armed Forces are exempted
from the Law, but even if partially implemented it may add
severe constraints largely due to increased cost and admini-
strative complexity. In general, to operate efficiently will
require more personnel and hence more money. And as strange
as it may sound, on ships far away from their homeport, staying
in port from Thursday to Monday may not be what a majority of
the crew wants, but that is what is regarded to be progress.
Another aspect that should be noted is that assignment
of officers to department and division billets is done by a
central office at the Navy Headquarters. Before the petty-
officers were converted to officers, the Captain at least
partially assigned officers to their duties . This new practice
36

was probably introduced to minimize local conflicts regarding
who is appointed to be, say, department head, when two well-
qualified officers are present. It might have created hard
feelings if the CO decided on the junior one. But the Captain
has obviously lost flexibility. If he finds it necessary to
reshuffle his officers between departments/divisions, this is
now quite a process. Those concerned have to be consulted and
approval must be obtained before anything can be changed.
Likewise, a rating is ordered to serve in his speciality.
Hence, the rating's department or division will be specified.
However, if an enlisted man shows other interests and
abilities, a transfer is normally not difficult to arrange
provided the sailor agrees. Furthermore, any CO/XO has to
keep in mind that the Chief of Defense has ordered programs
to be worked out to give the ratings maximum possible oppor-
[121tunity to participate. Therefore, it is important to find
and implement procedures to meet this standard. It is not
always easy even to discover suitable areas for such activities,
because so much of what is going on is heavily structured.
Participation is just not possible under such circumstances or
at least not very meaningful.
Summary
The CO has to solve an optimization problem. He is given
limited resources in the form of budget, human resources, and
technical systems. In addition, he has quite a few formal
requirements that must be observed, which further limits his




B. MODELLING THE FRIGATE
An effort to integrate the various aspects of knowledge
available in the literature and relevant to the frigate as a
system is a major undertaking. It is not possible to do justice
to all different approaches to organizational problems that can
be applied on different system levels. Since the aim is to
apply results of research findings to selected areas of inter-
est, the descriptions of theories will be done as short as
possible by summaries. The texts listed as references 28, 26,
and 24 are recommended for general overviews. Furthermore, an
introduction to and comparison between two of the most promis-
ing models of leadership, from an applied point of view, is
given in Appendix A. The decisions regarding which factors
should be emphasized are done somewhat arbitrarily. The se-
lections are based upon knowledge of warship organizational
problems in the Royal Norwegian Navy obtained from articles
in periodicals and unclassified internal studies, but they
mainly rest upon the author's own experiences and inclinations
modified through discussions with a number of colleagues.
1. A System Levels Model
From a system point of view the frigate may be looked
upon as an open system in interaction with the Navy and society.
Internally, the social system of the vessel can be considered
as consisting of subsystems of the individual, group, and
r 26
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organizational levels, L respectively, as illustrated in
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The Frigate Viewed as an Open Social System - Three
Levels of Internal Subsystems (Interactions with
External Environment Indicated)
a. Individual Level
A general characterization of members of the main
social groups present on the frigate has been given earlier
(Section IIIA) . For all categories of personnel, their moti-
vational status is crucial for the organizational usefulness
of their efforts. If the individual's needs cannot be satis-
fied through behavior consistent with activities pursuing the
goals of the organization, there is a problem. Such conflicts
must be solved by adjusting the sociotechnical design so as to
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meet both requirements simultaneously (Herbst, 1975) to obtain
r 25
1
optimal organizational output. Next, the factors that seem
likely to be of importance for persons placed at different organi-
zational levels in the systems will be investigated.
(1) The Commanding Officer (CO) and the Executive
Officer (XO) . Based on the two dimensions of separate leader-
ship functions found to be needed to make group-work efficient,
Senger (1971) hypothesized that a two-person leaderteam might
T431be a solution. J Quite a few researchers have published
findings suggesting such an idea. Senger found that commanding
officers and executive officers indeed functioned as a team,
providing mutual support and being complementary to one another.
In a majority of cases the commanding officer mainly concerned
himself with the relationship needs, while the executive officer
was in charge of task related activities (Fiedler, 19 or
Appendix A) .. But sometimes the roles were reversed.
Having observed executive officers change their
roles in order to complement a new commanding officer, it seems
reasonable to suggest that the commanding officer, either explic-
itly through consistent behavior, indicates his domain. Then
the executive officer to the best of his abilities tries to
provide the rest of the leadership activities needed. Depending
upon the match of the officers' skills in their tasks and human
relations functions as well as the flexibility exhibited in
support of one another, the teamwork may turn out more or less
efficient.
A complicating factor pointed out by Senger is
that even though a complementary relationship is obviously needed
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for successful co-management, most leaders tend to perceive
the subordinate's (i.e., the executive officer) competence as
a function of one's own personal value orientation.
Since Senger has shown that leaders consis-
tently tend to rate subordinates who share their own value
orientation higher than those who do not, we have seemingly a
contradiction at hand. According to Fiedler the task-oriented
person has the least ability to perform objective analysis of
T191interpersonal relations. Hence, the most likely case to
occur would be for a CO with such inclinations to grade his
relation oriented XO unfairly low on fitness reports . Given
this guidance, many executive officers would tend to adjust
their behavior in the direction indicated by the captain since
feedback is a very effective reinforcer of behavior. Thus,
having the XO abandon his role as social -emotional leader, the
vessel would most certainly experience more dissatisfaction,
discipline problems, and lowering of morale because of increased
conflict between personal needs satisfaction and organizational
goals for the individuals onboard. How should the Navy try to
avoid such undesired developments? A combination of several
factors which seem to be of importance might improve the
average results. The Navy Regulations (NAVREG) formally es-
tablish different spheres of functional responsibilities. J
If the commanding officer (CO) reduces the authority of the
executive officer (XO) to an unacceptable level, the latter
may right back by referring to his instructions . Such an
approach at least gives the XO powers that could prove bene-
ficial to the overall efficiency by providing him with a platform
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from which he may continue to carry out his functions despite
poor relations with the CO. Knowledge of the need for dual
leadership and the presence of perceptional bias in one's
grading of subordinates could also help. A natural way to go
seems to be case studies combined with role playing.
Another factor that might improve the per-
formance of the CO/XO team, is explicitly stated goals. Then,
not so much effort has to be spent resolving differences in
perception of goals . Instead they can concentrate on the
practical aspects of how to fulfill the objectives. However,
if goals are to provide the guidance and incentive intended,
the performance of the vessel has to be evaluated against this
set standard. Then the feedback will be meaningful, and it
r 34 1
will reinforce desired behavior. Linsay 1 J has shown that
the output produced by an organization is strongly affected by
what inspectors are known to look for. Other areas of equal
or greater importance are neglected because those factors are
not being given any significant weight in the evaluation of the
overall performance. In the context of the peactime frigate
this might materialize in the spending of a disproportionate
amount of time on activities such as cleaning, haircut,
marching drills, sports or any other possible "pet area" of the
CO or an inspecting flag officer. It is human when war seems
far away that the personal goals of the CO, in this case his
prospects for promotion, are taken care of first, followed
by satisfaction of organizational goals when conflict occurs.
Since a vessel will operate under the operational command of
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different admirals, chances are that concurrent changes in
priorities will take place. Quite a few of the "pet areas"
might have only marginal value as an output from a strict
combat readiness point of view. The XO will in few instances
deviate from the COs priorities. If the XO fails to meet the
standards expected by the CO or the inspecting flag-officer,
most COs would be inclined to penalize such failure rather
heavily.
It has certainly been indicated that it is of
utmost importance to supply the Captain with the right incen-
tives . A suitable approach might be to introduce functional
teams of inspectors reporting directly to the officer who
writes the Co's fitness reports. Such a system demands well-
established, explicitly formulated standards for satisfactory
performance within every specialty, system, and operational
function at discrete points in time measured in, say, months
since the majority of the present crew arrived (crew maturity)
.
It would be a substantial task to establish the specific ob-
jectives necessary to omplement a goal -hierarchy system, but
the prospects seem so promising that such an undertaking might
be justified. It should not only help to minimize the conflicts
between personal goals of the CO/XO and those of the organiza-
tion, but it would also specify clearly to everybody on board
what is expected of each one. It also provides a basis for
fair and realistic feedback. Goal clarity and knowledge of
own performance are both known to create good motivation . By
emphasizing one groups and competition between groups, an
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excellent condition for favorable within group development
should emerge. If group members identify and use their own
group as a reference, very strong relations should result.
It has been shown that an individual's commitment
to the norms, needs, and requirements of his primary group is
the single most important factor contributing to development
of a person's fighting efficiency and endurance. J This is,
of course, only the case as long as there is no problem in
integrating the behavior required to pursue the organizational
goals with satisfaction of personal needs. Having examined
the general motivational situation of the CO/XO, the next group
of individuals to be considered are the remaining officers.
(2) Other Officers. With a high degree of con-
fidence it can be assumed that the officers as individuals are
strongly motivated to do well. But lack of clearly stated goals,
inconsistency in- the importance of organizational objectives,
and behavior being positively reinforced through fitness reports
or other types of rewards may create conflicts analog to those
experienced by the CO/XO. It will again be impossible to work
efficiently for the advantage of the unit and at the same time
obtain maximum personal benefits. However, the use of detailed
objectives as guidance could again prove helpful and ensure:
(a) security (what is expected is explained
and known)
(b) meaningful feedback (the standards required
is explicitly spelled out)
(c) relative independence to establish leadership
in own area of responsibility since the aim




(d) motivation through constant feedback about
own performance as well as the inspiration
that follows from competition.
Concerning the officers, the CO/XO team will
provide the most important source of feedback, but their evalua-
tion has to be modified to comply with the presumably more ob-
jective and prestigious judging of the team of inspectors. This
fact enlargens the independence of the officers somewhat, since
it would be difficult for a CO to justify a downgrading of the
performance of an officer he has had some professional disagree-
ments with if the inspectors give him and his crew top ratings.
The most likely thing to happen is that the CO would change his
opinion because top scores in any division or function is very
beneficial for him, too. The system with inspectors will,
therefore, probably tend to diminish evaluation based on purely
non-professional criteria, since a number one officer in the eyes
of the CO is quite likely to drop in status if he is rated low.
Again, the important aspect to remember is that all obstacles
that prevent an officer from working for his own best interest,
when putting maximum effort into reaching the organizational
goals, should be removed or at least minimized.
Another factor that would most certainly help
motivate officers would be the introduction of qualifying exams
for an officer-of-the-watch certificate. The CO should retain
some authority in this field by approving the practical parts
of the test. The theoretical subjects could be covered either
through stated objectives and self-studies (correspondence, PSI)
,
a system course, or a combination of all. Similarly, a required
qualifying system course to become CO would probably also con-
tribute to an increase in overall professional standard and ought

to be considered. It is difficult to accept that such a scheme
is necessary only for submariners
.
(3) Ratings. Due to the involuntary aspects of
universal conscription, much reluctance and often negative
feelings can be experienced among the individual sailors . This
sometimes surfaces in aggressiveness and a negative attitude
towards officers, the Navy, and the armed forces in general or
as violent actions against fellow sailors to dissipate some of
the accumulated frustration.
A main problem is, therefore, to change the
behavior of negative elements and to prevent or reduce their
possible influence on others. As for the officers, this can
only be done when it is possible for the ratings to find a
reasonable degree of satisfaction of individual needs while
being a productive team member. As explained before, the young
men come from all backgrounds, and they have quite different
references to guide them. But they all seem to have a strong
common wish to resist the ultimate effects of uniformity.
Therefore, it is important for most of them that they are now
allowed to wear civilian clothes on shore-leave except on
special occasions. This gives them an opportunity to relate
to their former member groups which usually serve as their
reference group as far as fashions and behavioral values are
concerned. Talking individually to crew members displaying
There has been a qualifying course for COs of submarines
for many years in the RNoN.
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negative reactions might surface some indication of their
problems. In many cases a solution can be found, and the
sailor could become a valuable member of the team and sometimes
be very grateful to the officer who helped him out.
Assuming that the basic physiological needs
are always taken care of, one would imagine that security and
safety needs would be very important when arriving in an un-
familiar situation. This should indicate that an emphasis on
explaining the norms and standards required in detail to every-
body would be most helpful in the adjustment process. Nobody
likes to be laughed at or regarded a fool because he does not
know some of. the rules which are important onboard a ship but
different from norms followed in other places. In general,
humans adjust rapidly. If not properly guided, the newly
arrived will develop norms of their own, some of which might
not work to the benefit of the organization. This aspect will




The group has already been emphasized in the dis-
cussion of the individual level. However, the group seems to
play such an important part in the establishment and maintenance
of fighting ability that some of its attributes have to be
investigated further.
To illustrate the importance of group coherency,
a British study after the war investigating the unbelievable
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discipline displayed by the Germany Army towards the end of
World War II, when it was obvious to everybody that defeat was
certain, revealed that the explanation probably had to be found
in the brickstone group structure of the units . *• Each squad
was composed of soldiers from the same village, countryside,
or big city street. The platoons and companies were then built
up by neighboring streets or their equivalents. The noncommis-
sioned officers were all from the same district, speaking the
local dialect of their soldiers. In the defense role, the units
would also be assigned to defend their own regions, which meant
their own homes, relatives, and communities. The important
aspect of this practice, apart from making it easier and faster
to develop group coherency due to common values, was that per-
formance during combat incidents was not only motivated by the
need for maintaining status in the group, survival, care of
friends, and self-respect but also because of the fear of losing
respect and status in the local community after the war was
over for failing to have performed as expected of a German
soldier. When resistance stopped, it was the group that
surrendered, not individuals. This example shows the importance
of how members of a group are selected. Since Norway has uni-
versal conscription, schemes have been developed to ensure the
best possible use of the manpower available. J The procedures
have recently been revised. Besides physical fitness and
psychological aptitude tests which divide the recruits into
combat and noncombat categories, a few other attributes are used
for further classification. The most important ones are
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intelligence and aptitude tests (profiles for abilities in
science and mechanical skills) , level of education, work
experience, and special skills. The attributes of the indi-
vidual are then matched against a list of required ability
attributes for the different Army, Navy, and Air Force
specialties, taking into account whenever possible the recruit's
choice of service.
Assuming that the specified requirements are ade-
quate and that those assigned to the frigate in the various
positions meet the specifications, what then are the special
characteristics of the shipborne groups?
Compared to a work group where, for instance, the
members are only together for eight hours per day, five days
a week, the formal group on a ship requires individual partici-
pation and interaction with other group members 24 hours a day
as long as the person stays onboard. The individual is deprived
of normal privacy in the way he knows it in civilian life. There
is no place to withdraw, either to a family or to a sparetime
activity, quite apart from the work-related situation. On a
warship the quarters are so modest that few private secrets can
be kept. The formal group works together and has quarters
together. Therefore, more often than not due to the sociological
r 1 gi
axioms of proximity and frequency, the formal group will
develop into a primary group. As opposed to a secondary group
where membership is sought for a specific purpose such as dancing
or golf, a primary group is characterized by members showning
their true and unmasked feelings and personality characteristics
including fear, anger, ambitions, prejudices, stereotype, joy,
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etc. Hence, a very crucial point in building a basis for
effective teamwork is the development of a common reference
group from this collection of individuals. First, a common
goal must be anticipated. According to Navy Regulations, ' 247 «3
the prospects of having to sacrifice their own lives should be
explained to the crew's sailors. Next, they should learn to
appreciate the importance of every one ' s contribution to ensure
a successful outcome in combat situations. Third, they should
in detail be explained the purpose of their own jobs and the
part they constitute in the overall design of the ship as a
fighting unit.
The officers in charge of the divisions and depart-
ments must work very hard and be determined to lead the internal
group processes in the direction wanted. They have to take
active part in the training program so they can respond to the
needs of their group members without delay. By observing they
can also learn much about who is doing what within the division.
This might guide them well, when time comes to select leading
seamen. Negative elements may be spotted and given special
treatment. Specific assignments may help to motivate them.
By somewhat ignoring poor performances that are not so grave
that negative action is absolutely necessary and praising jobs
well done, the effects of positive reinforcement may work, but
it is always a slow path to follow. However, manpower is a
scarce resource in Norway, so anything short of a best effort
is difficult to justify. Competition between groups can prove
useful in the context of within group development, when applied
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with care. If each department and division as well as the
different watches get assigned a certain amount of points
considered appropriate as an indicator of relative contribution
to overall combat effectiveness, the total sum of points might
be used as an approximate measure of effectiveness. It should
also be possible to earn extra points through accomplishments
in support areas like welfare and sports. If the ship has, say,
a unit newspaper, an excellent soccer team or can demonstrate
activities in similar areas, additional points should be given
to the ship. It should also be possible to reward overall pro-
perness and smartness in military bearing with some plus points.
For example, by assigning equal amount of points to say red,
blue and white watches, there is an excellent opportunity for
intergroup competition in seamanship skills at sea as well as
watchkeeping abilities in harbor. Furthermore, if a system of
external expert teams is implemented and they grade on an
absolute scale, sonar crew on vessel A may compete with equiva-
lent division/department members onboard frigate B in the same
combat unit. And by adding up points ships may compete, and
so can divisions or squadrons. There may be a "best frigate
of the year" trophy, but only to make the results known may
provide the feedback and inspiration needed to improve efforts
.
It has been indicated that the active and considerate
participation by the officers in the program of their groups
could serve the purpose of strongly reducing the probability
that group norms contradictory to the fulfillment of organiza-
tional objectives are established. Besides the possibility of
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earning them respect and trust, this approach could enable the
officers to sense emerging conflicts at an early stage. Hence,
problems can be solved constructively if the leaders take part
and stay aware. Furthermore, the group development process is
not disrupted.
In general, involuntary service often implies that
there is no great enthusiasm for their situation as crew members.
Therefore, friendship and security in their formal group are a
necessity for many conscripted sailors. If they fail to be
accepted or do not find any affiliation in their relations with
the other group members, it is often very difficult for them to
adjust. Within groups harmony and mutual support might be the
most valuable asset that the ship can offer a sailor. If this
quality is lacking life might become very difficult to endure
onboard the ship. Often all activities can be experienced as
totally meaningless and without purpose for a sailor, in that
r 16
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situation. Therefore, the importance of the group can
hardly be stressed enough. Likewise, it should by now be quite
clear that if the officers fail their responsibilities to monitor
and guide at the initial state, it will be extremely difficult to
change already established patterns later on. Attitudes are not
easy to alter.
It might also be useful to look at some of the
traditional attributes commonly used by military leaders as
indicators to estimate the combat ability or "military worth"
r c c "i
of a group of fighting men. In the text "Naval Leadership" 1
definitions and elaborate discussions of discipline, morale,
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loyalty/ professionalism (of leaders) , and 1* esprit de corps
can be found. In the following treatment these attributes will
be dealt with rather casually. The intention is to explain
their meaning in the context and terminology of group psychology
which is slightly different from the traditional way of presenting
the discussion.
Discipline can be interpreted as the degree to which
formal norms are followed by the members of the organization.
As long as the norms of the various groups coincide with (or fall
within) the region of formal behavior to be observed by every
crew member, there is no conflict. The reason why the directions
or rules are not broken may be due to positive or negative in-
centives. If it is done because the regulations are accepted as
necessary and useful and are followed whether superiors are
present or not, the discipline is positively motivated. If the
compliance is based on fear of punishment, the discipline is
negative. If the rules are accepted as a norm or value reference
for the person guiding his behavior pattern even outside the
context of his organization, this person is likely to live up
to the standard given by his superiors whatever the consequences.
Such an individual has self-discipline. He needs no further
guidance or motivation to follow the given norms . In a group
where those with self-discipline in the sense explained are
the norm builders or natural leaders on the informal level,
morale is likely to be high. J
The last step in this analysis will be to look at
the combined effects of the individual and group efforts , at
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the level which is called the organization. The goals justify-
ing the very existence of the frigate will be found on this
level. In other words, the total system has to produce a
satisfactory output in accordance with the expectations
different vested-interest groups (i.e., the Navy and society)
have regarding quantity and/or quality of the produced services
.
c. Organizational Level
At the organizational level the frigate's perform-
ance will be compared with that of other frigates. Based on
observed accomplishments a reputation as a fighting unit will
be earned. Merits in exercises might be important for pride
and self-confidence, but more often than not observers outside
the ship itself will use other criteria. From experience it is
known that important output factors in this context are:
(1) The CO's ability to maneuver out of and into
port, including the elegance with which he handles the ship when
securing along a pier.
(2) The speed and precision with which the deck
crew ties up the vessel in harbor.
(3) The uniform and orderly appearance of the deck
crew when proceeding in and out of harbor. (Different uniforms,
loud shouting especially when swear words are used, and ineffi-
cient handling of securing lines always make a poor impression.)
(4) The display of correct and firm behavior, proper
looks, and smartly kept uniforms will always suggest military
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efficiency when exhibited by men on duty in port and tend to
create respect and belief in the ship's ability as a fighting
unit.
(5) The behavior of crew members in port when on
shore leave or otherwise absent from the ship.
The items listed above might not seem to be the most crucial
ones in the objective evaluation of the ship's fighting capa-
bilities and that is probably true. But as Admiral F. H.
Johannessen, former Norwegian Chief of Defense, pointed out
to the midshipmen at the Naval Academy, when he was their
director, these factors are important because neither civilians
nor those who evaluate the morale and ability of our forces for
purposes of possible confrontation have the opportunity to take
[291part in exercises at sea. J
Anyway, the reputation of the unit has a profound
impact on the morale and 1' esprit de corps of the crew. Meaning-
ful, fair competition between units could increase motivation
significantly in the areas included. In the Royal Norwegian
Navy this potential incentive is only realized to a very little
extent outside the area of sports. Games where units compete
are being arranged twice a year. One arrangement takes care
of summer sports, the second covers winter sport activities.
However, assuming specific criteria exist in the form of opera-
tional requirements, rewards such as "the Frigate of the Year"
could be introduced. And that honor would most certainly
provide a meaningful addition to the factors listed above as




Various symbols of the unit such as patches,
pictures on matchboxes and postcards that can be used by
individuals to indicate membership have always been a useful
tool in maintaining 1* esprit de corps. Nowadays, when crew
members seldom use the uniform when on leave, the function of
these items probably has become even more important. Activi-
ties that create results that can be of common pride should be
strongly encouraged for similar reasons. An excellent dance
band for example can bring fame to the ship especially if its
name can be associated with that of the vessel.
The justification of a warship's existence is its
contribution to the deterrent against external aggression that
a country's armed forces are supposed to accomplish. Since the
main purpose is to prevent war, the mission has already been
partly failed if war breaks out. But only in that case can
combat be experienced and the true quality of the frigate's
output be established. Therefore, all peacetime criteria
however clever they might be designed are somewhat artificial
.
But since war is such a dreadful business, all possible efforts
should be tried to develop the best possible substitute criteria
so that the money and manpower used in this area can contribute
optimally to the efforts of keeping peace. In brief, the
presence of what in Navy terminology is called a happy (and
effective) ship can be indicated or found when sailors:
(1) show self-respect and pride in their groups
(division, watch, and unit)
.




(3) accept the authority of officers.
(4) follow the rules and regulations governing
their roles as crew members.
(5) rapidly accept, learn, and adjust to the
norms of their new shipmates with a minimum amount of conflict.
(6) show initiative to fix malfunctions imme-
diately and suggest volunteer work to improve the appearance of
their ship.
(7) besides being good in their jobs, show
high-level sparetime activities in areas like sports, bridge,
ship's newspaper, ship's band, etc.
Summary
Regarding the frigate, persons placed on different levels in
the hierarchy may vary substantially in their need structure.
If an efficient unit is going to develop the sociotechnical
system has to allow for satisfaction of needs of all personnel
categories within the frame of the activities required to be
carried out in pursuit of organizational goals. If conflicts
arise, the individual goals normally will be given priority.
The possibility of negative sanctions from the group members
in most cases outweigh the presence of similar threats on the
formal level if the latter is not of extreme consequence.
Therefore, the development of norms that are in harmony with
the activities necessary to achieve required goals is an aim
in its own right and can never be guaranteed to happen. But
active participation in the group process on the part of the
officers could minimize the probability of the development of




In the maintenance of desirable norms, the establishment
of 1' esprit de corps should be pursued vigorously. Pride in
unit membership is probably the single most valuable tool in
keeping up motivation, positive discipline, and morale and
hence a very helpful basis for improving performance. Care-
fully used, friendly competition between groups and units more
often than no proves to be of value in maintaining effort and
pride
.
The presence of operational objectives at the individual,
I group, and organizational levels is considered to be useful
from several point of view and will:
- provide clearer understanding of organizational goals.
- make it easier to communicate meaningfully.
- increase the value of feedback since a standard to
measure against is present.
- make it possible for ratings to participate in the
planning process because the requirements are known.
- provide a meaningful guide for self-evaluation and
the identification of weak areas to be given extra
attention and priority for improvement.
2. The Frigate as a Sociotechnical System
The first systematic approach to organization was based
[28, pp. 144-145] , . , „on the work of F. Taylor and is known under the
name scientific management. The principles of this school have
been widely used in designing organizations. The man in the
system is analyzed and treated like a machine . The most well-
known area of application is the assembly line . According to
r 541Walker and Guest jobs designed in agreement with the basic
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philosophy of this method exhibit the following characteris-
tics:' 28 ' »• 1451
a. Mechanical pacing. (The speed at which the employees





c. Low skill requirement. (Easy to learn jobs - minimum
training costs, maximum flexibility.)
d. Concentration on only a fraction of the product.
e. Limited social interaction.
f. Predetermination of tools and techniques (determined
by staff specialists)
.
The design of many jobs onboard the frigate is based on
the principles of scientific management, (e.g., tasks of the
gunnery crew) . The 'idea is to produce a maximum number of
rounds fired per time unit by maximum use of specialization and
simplication allowing efficient drill procedures to be implemented.
The advantage the gunnery officer has , compared to the
assembly line foreman, is (1) that the quality and quantity of
the output might make the difference between life and death,
(2) that the exercises do not have to last for a whole work day,
and (3) immediate feedback of performance is given. The gunnery
crew also has many other tasks to perform regarding maintenance
and general watch-keeping duties.
The important point to observe is, according to
Herbs t: ' PP* "(that) the technological system determines
the characteristics of the social system through the allocation
of work roles and the technologically given dependence relations
between tasks. Performance is a function of the joint operation
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of the social and technical systems. Functional consequences
of the social system are not easily modified insofar as the
social structure is based on the requirements of the techno-









Figure 4. Sociotechnical Interactions tHerbst ' 1974, 25, p. 4]
A study that has become almost classical in the field
of organizational behavior was conducted at the Hawthorne Plant
r 42
1
of the Western Electric Company. J A significant discovery
was that individuals develop informal norms to protect them-
selves against the most inhuman demands created by the technol-
r 8
1
ogy surrounding them. The most important rules found can be
j * -n [42]summarized as follows :
(1) You should not turn out too much work. If you
do you are a ratebuster.
(2) You should not turn out too little work. If
you do, you are a chiseler.
(3) You should not tell a supervisor anything that




(4) You should not attempt to maintain social
distance or act officious. If you are an inspector, for
example, you should not act like one. ("You should be one
of us.")l
The interpretation that the main function of norms are
protective is supported by the work of the Norwegian sociologist
Lysgaard. He distinguishes between the technical-economical
system which has its values connected with efficiency, profit,
etc. It is the basic or planned part of the organization on
which the informal social system is based. Lysgaard calls this
the human system. The technical economical system offers some-
thing to the members, but it is also demanding. Many times the
requirements appear unlimited, unresponsive (to human needs)
,
and overwhelming. Apart from the primary group membership
Lysgaard also identifies a broader system that includes all sub-
ordinates or workers. Some are members without knowing it, others
are against their will. He calls it the collective of workers.
Lysgaard lists the following conditions are necessary for
the development of a collective: "' p * }
(1) A formal, planned organization guided by
efficiency and profit, i~e., a technical-economical system.
(2) An employment contract.
(3) Individuals can refuse personal relationship to
Freely after Roethlisberger and Dickson
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the technical-economical system and regulate their attachment
towards it through the collective.
According to Lysgaard there are three main forms of
. . [35, p. 89]
membershxp: l ' ^
(1) The active, norm setting or interpreting ones.
(2) The passive accepting ones.
(3) The active opposing ones (who are members through
their position in the technical-economical system, but do not
recognize the collective and its norms)
.
One may ask what all this had to do with the frigate. The
main point is to show that if the officers do not respond to the
needs of the ratings, a common social system may develop among
them to protect their human integrity. Lysgaard' s conclusions
r 25 1
are clearly in agreement with those of Herbst. J To establish
an effective unit, the sociotechnical system has to satisfy
organizational goals and human needs at the same time. Onboard
a vessel this is even more important due to the special condi-
tions existing. Sailors have to live onboard their ship 24 hours
a day, not just for the duration of the workday. This adds
extra stress on the individual and increases the improtance of
awareness towards the satisfaction of human needs. The sailors
also have many common characteristics (conscription, status,
uniform, age, working conditions, etc.), and they share many
problems (difficulty adjusting to the warship environment,
responsiblity for own washing and cleaning, crowded living
quarters, lack of privacy, few alternative sparetime activities,
modest cash allowance, etc.).
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However, there is a significant difference. While
factory workers often have similar backgrounds and basic values,
r 39 l
the subscripted sailors are recruited from all shades of life. J
They represent many different social, economical, occupational,
and educational groups. Quite a few have already held positions
of leadership, others have been educated to become future leaders.
Even though such persons by status are common crew members, it is
the experience of the author that their values are usually closer
to those of the officers. Therefore, as long as insight and
experience are applied in combination with awareness and common
sense, the development of a workable social system within the
given technology should be possible. Those with leadership ex-
perience or aspiration will more often than not belong to those
who are active, norm setting or interpreting. By treating those
key persons (who may relatively easily be identified by observa-
tion if the officers taken an active part in the program of their
groups) as mature, responsible individuals and by delegating
authority to them, they might prove very valuable in the develop-
ment of efficient groups. This is not to say that they are the
agents of the officers in a manipulative sense (one possible
viewpoint of course) , but rather a communication link. They
know the agonies and reactions of the group members which they
can explain to their division heads. They can also often help
the officers by interpreting to group members the purpose and
intentions of actions taken by their superiors . This is a
direct contribution to the development of a workable socio-





Next, let us consider a general input-output model.

















Figure 5. General Model of Open System. From Blegen and
Nylen [5 ' *" 22]
Ivancevich and others ' "" suggest the same basic
slightly extended model. According to them an organization
involves a number of activities (See Figure 6)
:
(1) Receiving inputs.
(2) Transforming the inputs - controlling, coordinat-
ing, and maintaining the necessary activities to produce results,
(3) Generating outputs.
a. Input Factors
Inputs, are the human and technical resources made avail-
able to the -frigate as a basis for the CO to accomplish his mission.
Included is the ship itself with its standard equipment of weapons























Figure 6. A Basic Systems Model. From Ivancevich, Szilogyi,
and Wallace [28 ' P- 315 ^
type, number, and sophistication of weapons systems; etc.,
constitute basic limitations and possibilities. The same applies
to the human element. Crew members, officers as well as men,
are assigned to serve, and their knowledge of how to do things,
their professional skills, educational level, and motivation
vary considerably. Therefore, it is somewhat arbitrary and for
the most part outside the powers of the CO to influence the
quality of the inputs. However, quantitatively he may ensure
that he is given the correct number of crew members of each
category as well as the systems and inventory he is entitled





Applying the subsystems of control, maintenance, and
coordination the CO tries to transform the input into the output
factors which the frigate is supposed to produce. The overall
output is fighting efficiency or ability to survive and cause
maximum damage to opponents in combat situations. This stated
: goal is not operational and has to be quantified and qualified
by specific objectives that can supply meaningful guidance on
the levels where practical activities take place.
Since the operational objectives apply on subsystem
level, coordination of activities is a crucial factor to prevent
suboptimalization in the pursuit of organizational goals . The
structure required to integrate all effort efficiently in combat
readiness situations creates the need for strict, formal proce-
idures. Hence, the coordination subsystem plays an extremely
important role in combining all resources optimally towards
fulfilling the frigate ' s goal
.
However, it is of equal importance to make sure
that the different functional subsystems (departments and divi-
sions) emphasize the correct areas in planning, training, and
the maintenance of equipment. The control subsystem is used
to monitor all activities to see if progress is made to meet
set standards . Effective control requires that relevant criteria
exist against which to measure individual, group and organiza-
tional performance in the operation and maintenance of systems.
Control yields the information and feedback necessary to evaluate,
review, and change programs. Moreover, control also requires
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the checking of inputs. For example, improvement or deteriora-
tion in basic professional training of officers or men may be
detected and reported back to institutions responsible for such
programs
.
It should be emphasized that efficient control depends
upon the availability of operational objectives and goal clarity.
If no required standards are specified, feedback can only be
general and of limited value. Furthermore, generalities provide
poor guidance with regard to which areas should be given higher
priorities in adjusting training and maintenance programs.
No formal organizational structure, however well it
may be designed, gives any guarantee that the human members of
the organization will behave in accordance with the norms and
required duties of their roles. Onboard a man-of-war it might
mean the difference between life and death if anybody does not
know his job and makes a serious mistake in combat. The same
applies to negligence of duties and sloppiness in keeping equip-
ment running properly. Therefore, a primary objective for any
| CO is to explain this fact to his officers and men alike and
try to make them understand and accept the challenges and
responsibilities implied. If he succeeds in doing this, a major
accomplishment has been reached. However, in order to keep the
crew members motivated for continued efforts, a maintenance
system is needed consisting of subsystems for socializing,
rewarding, and sanctioning. In order to fulfill the organiza-
tional goals, certain rules of behavior are required to regulate
interrelations among individuals and between groups . These norms
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are often quite different from those the conscripted sailors
have experienced in the society outside the military. Therefore,
the process of establishing acceptance for the rules guiding life
onboard a man-of-war might both be difficult for those in charge
as well as painful for the individuals who are required to adjust
and comply. Socialization is a slow process, and positive rein-
forcement and patient explanation usually works better in the
long run than extensive use of harsh punishment. However, the
military system demands obedience, so discipline is a necessity.
Hence, sanctions must be used against willful wrongdoings and
in cases of gross neglect of duties. On the other hand, excellence
in performance or effort should as often as possible be rewarded.
A word of recognition is many times enough to reinforce improve-
ments.t 23 ' 30 ^
It should be pointed out that in the context of a
warship where teamwork is of such importance, rewards should as
often as possible be given to a whole group. Individual rewards
might create jealousy, conflict and unsound competition between
team members while group rewards tend to strengthen proudness of
group membership and improve relations between individual
members. The norm should be cooperation and participation
within groups and friendly competition between groups. This
does not mean that outstanding individual achievements should
be overlooked but that emphasis ought to be on group development.
However, punishment should always be given to the individual
involved, never to the group. Attention should be paid to the




The military is a nonprofit organization. The bene-
fits produced by our frigate are extrinsic and the general public
is the prime beneficiary. The frigate is owned by the public,
and its expected services are combat potential and readiness. [28]
d. External Environment
When an organization is viewed as an open system,
the interactions it has with the surrounding environment must be
considered. [28] External forces may be regarded to be super-

















Figure 7 . General Open System Organization in Interaction with
External Environment. Freely after Belgen and Nylen. ' p *
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The societal environmental factors listed as supersystems in
Figure 7 most certainly play a role in the input-transformation-
output process of our frigate.
All military organizations will heavily rely upon
the general attitude of the public in matters concerning
defense. This is especially true in a democratic country
depending on universal conscription and mobilization forces.
Changes in political climate and cultural factors will directly
influence the day to day activities in the armed forces as
pointed out in the background discussion in Section I
.
Technical advances will start the introduction of
new systems and weapons which in turn obviously will require
different training programs and cause tactical procedures to be
altered. Likewise, improvements in logistic support will often
facilitate the efforts of keeing complicated systems working
and hence help increase the overall readiness.
Fluctuations in the economy of a country will in
most cases be reflected in the resources allocated to the
military. Finally, administrative regulations will in peacetime
tend to grow in amount and rigidity as the military establishment
becomes more bureaucratic and less functional. Limitations
imposed by such development can seriously hamper the efficiency
of military units . The Royal Norwegian Navy in particular has
been severely hurt by workhour rules for officers and the intro-
Tl 32
1
duction of the so-called environmental act. ' The over-
time pay and inconvenience benefits cost so much that only
sailings of relatively high operational priority can be justified
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outside the agreed workhours in addition to planned participa-
tion in major, scheduled exercises. Besides the fact that many
officers find the increased time spent in harbor, especially
when far from their homeport, of doubtful value, the decrease
in the sailing program most certainly requires improved planning
to prevent a decline in combat readiness.
Summary
In this section we have discussed the frigate as a socio-
technical system. We have seen that the social subsystem is
heavily dependent on the technical subsystems. The overall
situation of the sailors on our frigate was compared to that
;
of workers in a company. The examination revealed similarities
but also significant differences. We found that care has to be
taken so that conditions causing a sailors 1 collective to emerge
' are not met. Such developments would be counterproductive since
human needs might tend to be seen apart from the organizational
goals. Such separation would necessarily increase the level of
conflict between officers and ratings and much cleverness would
be spend in vain, each group trying to come out of confrontations
as the winner instead of working together.
Next, the general input-transformation-output model was pre-
sented and examined in the context of the frigate. The trans-
formation subsystems of control, maintenance, and coordination
were also considered. Finally, important external factors in-
fluencing the organization's internal systems, functions, and
processes were identified and discussed. We found that the
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surrounding environment plays a significant role in the process
of determining internal activities and priorities.
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES AND PROCESSES
The discussions so far have included:
(1) an examination of the background factors, and
(2) two different ways of describing the frigate
(a) an organizational level approach
(b) an input-output model
In this section some of the most important aspects regarding
organizational variables will be presented and discussed in
the context of the frigate.
1. Structural Levels
Every organization has some kind of structure. Blegen
rg I
and Nylen L J explain structure as "relatively stable patterns
that exist over time in a system." March and Simon ' ^*
have suggested the following definition: "Organization structure
consists of those aspects of the pattern of behavior in organi-
zations that are relatively stable and that change only slowly."
However, the degree of structure in different situations
has some important implications. Regarding the frigate, the
"action station" situation is extremely structured. If, for
example, the ship is under attack by aircraft, the desired out-
put is to shoot down the planes before any damage has been
sustained. In the absence of a formal procedure this mission
is virtually impossible due to the time element involved. A
successful outcome also would depend heavily upon proficiency
of drill independent of the potential of the weapons . The
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process can be viewed as an assembly-line with required se-
quential tasks consisting of detection, reporting, selection of
targets and weapons, weapons direction and control, opening of
fire, and ceasing of fire. Similar procedural chains have
been drilled for other systems as well. Another example is the
sonar (detects) and antisubmarine weapons (destroy the submarine)
combination. Likewise, when the Officer of the Watch is navi-
gating the ship, his orders to the helmsman are always exact,
and strict procedures for repeating orders and reporting back
when executed are always observed.
The necessity of structure in the examples given above
should be easy to understand and accept for most people. As
mentioned, the time factor is so crucial that if not every order
is correctly understood and promptly responded to, a disaster
could result. Either the frigate might be sunk, or the ship
I could be grounded or run into another vessel . It is also
required that it is absolutely clear who has the authority and
responsibility to make decisions and issue orders.
However, even on a man of war, there are aspects of
systems and processes that do not functionally require the same
rigid structure. An example case would be the deck crew when
securing the ship along a pier. Certainly, the possibilities
for individual judgment and action are still small, but if
surprises occur individual, rapid reactions might be praised
(if they are the right ones)
.
How does all this fit in with the participation directive
T121given by the Chief of Defense. In general, it most certainly
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shows that there are numerous areas where this program cannot
be applied. This conclusion has considerable support from














Figure 8. Organizational Structure of the Frigate. Freely after
Blegen and Nylen. [8, p ' 48]
Figure 8 illustrates that the output required in certain situ-
ations, as exemplified above by the action station and confined
water navigation cases, dictates the necessary activities. The
objectives are implicit (e.g., survival) and as long as the
technical system (e.g., physical structure) is given, the pro-
cedures (e.g., pattern of activities) are more or less fixed.
There is always room for minor refinements (e.g., minor changes
in formal organizational structure and as a consequence, the
pattern of activities) , but as long as the physical structure
remains the same, the basic constraints stay unchanged.
It is important to realize and explicitly point out that
the externally given performance standards in the areas con-
cerning combat readiness can only be changed by the responsible
authority. Minor deviations from approved procedures should,
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of course, be allowed to be internally implemented at the
discretion of the CO. However, such improvements should be
promptly reported in order for others to benefit if the pro-
posals are accepted as a procedure innovation by the proper
authority.
Research by Burns and Stalker 1 J and Woodward 1 '
indicates that organic or democratic organizational structure
(i.e., loosely structured pattern of activities) tend to create
discontent among members of the organization when introduced
in situations where the physical structure and given output
standards leave little room for meaningful major changes. In
short, when the product is determined and the assembly-line
built, there is not much left to discuss and/or alter. Hence,
people tend to be more content under such circumstances when
explicit rules and requirements are given. Therefore, the
studies referred to suggest that a mechanical or autocratic
organizational structure in such cases is more or less implied
by the technological system. Hence, the drill procedures used '
on the frigate in the situations described should not only be
effective from a time constraint output point of view, but also
from a consideration of crew satisfaction presuming the research
findings are relevant.
Hence, possibilities for fruitful participation has to
be found in areas outside these very structured ones. So far,
the frigate has been described by two main subsystems, the
social and the technical. If the technical system is divided
into two parts, the first subsystem will consist of activities
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which imply rigid or mechanical organizational structure,
while the second, even though subject to certain limitations
due to physical structure, can allow for more organizational
flexibility. An attempt to show this idea is made in Figure 9
The Frigate
Figure 9. Internal Subsystems of the Frigate. Freely after
Blegen and Nylen [8 ' p ' 31]
It can be seen that both of the technical subsystems interact
with the social subsystem and with each other. In the partici-
f 12
1
pation directive, the following areas are recommended as
suitable for the realization of the program.
(a) Training and education programs.
(b) Discipline, social customs.
(c) Quarter regulations, requirements, and inspection.
(d) Sparetime activities (including sports).
(e) Aspects of regulations for leave of absence.
(f) Other areas of welfare.
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The listing is by no means exhaustive, but provides good initial
guidance about which areas to choose from when trying to develop
meaningful participation schemes. The examination of the two
technical subsystems brings up the question of the goalsetting
process which will be investigated in the next section.
2. The Goal-Setting Process
It seems reasonable that the goal-setting process for
the two technical subsystems is different. In the case of the
technical-mechanical subsystem the goals are externally given
in the form of operational objectives. However, their form
is more or less a consequence of the situation (physical
structure, time constraint) as pointed out in the preceding
section. The process of revising goals and evaluating perform-





based upon the works of Bloom 1 and Krathwohl.
The model illustrates the usefulness of operation ob-
jectives that has been claimed on several occasions in preceding
discussions. Providing the exact performance criteria and
structural frame for the mechanical part of the subsystems, the
model makes an important contribution to the organic subsystems
as well. Arguments for the first area have already been pre-
sented, so the discussion will focus on the second aspect.
Confronted with explicit objectives for the first time,
many people react as if their very existence constitutes a con-
straint. However, objectives supply goal clarity or, in other
words, the directionin which to move, but prescribe no path to
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Figure 10 The Goal-Setting Process for the Technical -Subsystem.
Freely after lecture notes by L. S. Wilhelmsen,
University of Bergen, Norway.
that go to Rome." has full validity in this case. It is up to
the responsible officer to search for the best road. He should
make the best use of all available resources including the active
participation of his ratings. In this sense the model is a part
of the technical-mechanical subsystem as well as the technical-
organic subsystem. Regarding the latter, the department or
division officer should, of course, let the sailors have their
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own copies of the objectives. During debriefs everybody will
then have a common reference, and they can meaningfully make
statements about strong and weak areas. Weaknesses can be
identified and the ratings get the opportunity to share the
responsibility of deciding which areas need priority in training
efforts
.
In addition to adding valuable information due to the
knowledge and insight of the ratings, such debriefs will help
implement the participation program in a very constructive way.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the sailors will appreciate
having a say in their own training program. Hence, the proba-
bility of increased motivation on the part of the ratings ought
to be significant. External evaluation, say, by teams of in-
spectors as recommended in the discussion of the models of the
frigate, would supply additional information to the within group
considerations and provide extra guidance. Hopefully, such out-
side input will result in even more eagerness by adding incen-
tives to participation efforts. The more balanced, detailed,
concrete, and constructive the evaluation is, the better the
expected reinforcement of external feedback.
Most other items listed in the participation directive,
can be considered a part of the technical -organic subsystem in
interaction with social subsystem and the external supersystems
(see the models of the frigate) . The goals might not be explicitly
stated for quite a few activities in these areas, and the basic
values of the participants in the process might play a more im-
portant role as input than specific feedback. In many cases the
process itself will generate results that in fact are equivalent
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.o creating new (or explicit) goals. This process can finally
be modeled as a coalition of different groups of people trying
to hedge their interests by influencing the content of programs
and priority of associated activities subject to external and
internal constraints.
Figure 11. The Coalition Model (illustration) from Blegen and
m„i«„[ 8 / P. 162] _. _. [41]Nylen 1 * after Rhenman. J
r 41 i
According to Rhenman, the coalition is a mechanism for
balancing of conflict of interest and the establishment of
cooperation among the "participating partners. ' P* J The
participants have to agree upon a common goal that can prove
beneficial to everybody as shown in Figure 11. Hence, a common
denominator has to be found that will guarantee a minimum gain
to all of those who contribute. If the balancing is unsuccess-
ful, some will find it more advantageous to their cause to
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withdraw and maybe oppose the efforts of others to fulfill
the purpose of the organization (in this case the frigate)
.
In the organizational literature, the method of applying
measurable objectives is known as management by objectives (MBO)
.
It cannot be seen that the integration of the principles of MBO
methods •• ' PP* " and those of the educational goal
model presented in this section should cause any major difficulty.
The approaches are basically the same. They are only presented in
slightly different phrases because the schools of thoughts within
which they were developed vary in language traditions and the
areas of application.
It has been mentioned that specific objectives may be a
helpful device in reducing noise between people placed at
different levels in the organization, especially with regard to
perception and interpretation of goals. That brings up the
domain of communication theory which will be discussed next.
3. The Communication Process
Communications patterns are an integrated and important
part of the organization. Means and ways that are established
to communicate often create structures more crucial to the
soundness of the organization than any other aspect. Again
a rather narrow presentation has to suffice. The main objective
will be to make the point that in the theory of communication
the question of "how" is just as important as "what." In other
words, the choice of media and channel is not trivial even
though the content of the message sent is the same in an objective
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sense. In human communication noise arises from differences in
values, cultural backgrounds, and perceptive expectations plus
quite a few other sources. For example, members of one group
are often found to be pray to stereotypes regarding members of
other collections of people. All such factors influence the
interpretation of the message. In brief, it can be said that
humans communicate on two levels: (1) the subject level (an
analysis of the objective content of the message as phrased)
and (2) the emotional level (the additional information received
through gestures, emotions, values, etc., detected by the
receiver) . However, the latter might just as well be partly
caused by the receiver's own perceptual bias. Blegen and Nylen
r 8
1
have an excellent presentation of the Theory of Communication.
For those who do, not read Norwegian, the text by Owen, Page, and
r 38
1
Zimmerman is recommended for an overview. L When the CO
addresses the whole crew at one time, say, over the intercom
system, the communication is said to be one-way. In a group the
communication is two-way. If a receiver does not fully under-
stand the message, he may ask for further information or addi-
tional explanation. Hence, it should be clear that the ability
to listen is just as important an element in the process, as
the ability to speak.
In the following a few examples will be presented. Let
the first one be general. In a group of five persons there are
four men and one woman. Each time the woman speaks, one of the
male members at once starts talking to the two persons sitting
closest to him. Hence, only one of the four male members of
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the group listens to the arguments of the female. If the group
has to work together for a while it seems quite likely that the
woman will develop negative feelings towards the three who
always establish a subgroup when she has something to say. She
should not be blamed, since their behavior clearly communicates
p, strong message about their regards for women. Hence, their
values towards females have been revealed even though not a
negative word indicating such attitudes have been uttered.
The CO and his officers should watch out for similar
attitudes towards their sailors. People who regard themselves
as superior human beings compared with others will often reveal
their real values indirectly just as it happened in the example.
Furthermore, civilian stereotypes of career military (cartoons,
etc.) often suggest such attitudes in the value orientation of
officers. Hence, the negative and hypercritical elements of
i the crew will very likely keep a close watch to discover proofs
i of such behavior. Therefore, any officer should try his best
to learn to know his men individually. (Their names, occupation,
interests, where they live, marital status, etc.) Then it will
become quite natural to treat them as unique persons with
varying needs and not impersonally as an item on a list of
sailors which may be identified by numbers . Arrogant behavior
on the part of officers and feelings of superiority do not
demonstrate the human attributes that are required to command
sailors in war according to Kirst. He seems to mean that only
1






those who respect their subordinates as equally valuable humans,
are fit for such a task. Leaders of that kind of breed will
provide comfort and inspiration because the sailors will
receive the message of compassion and care in addition to bare
orders
.
It would be of interest to give examples of a few
different schemes COs might use to communicate. Consider a CO
who has minimum interaction with his officers . Once a week he
orders a line-up of the entire crew. At those occasions he
often informs at length about subjects that are quite new to
the crew including the officers . Most of the time he deals
with his officers through the XO, but not infrequently he calls
in a department head—always one at a time. Besides, he keeps
all but routine correspondence in his own file. The officers
are shown only such letters to which they are specifically
assigned to draft an answer. What are the likely effects to be
experienced if this scheme is implemented? First, the CO has
to rely on the XO for internal feedback since he has so few other
sources due to his self-imposed distance keeping. If he is
given the extra attributes that he gets very upset when he hears
bad news, a classical situation emerges. The XO censors the
information he feeds back to the Captain because he is afraid
of his reaction or because he likes to please the CO for other
reasons. Shortly the Captain will become disinformed or only
have partial information available to base his decisions on.
Hence, the consequences of what he decides might be grim in
many cases. Second, there are always motor noises and other
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disturbances present on a ship. Hence, more often than not,
many of those who listen will not hear clearly everything that
the Captain says. Besides, some sailors may not always compre-
hend what was said. In both cases they will go to their
division officer and ask for further explanation. Then they
will discover that he does not know any more than they do.
After a few such experiences they will not ask any more. It
should not be hard to understand what influence that will have
on the authority of junior officers and the morale of officers
and crew. Not only will lack of information make the officers
look stupid in the eyes of their subordinates, but since the
CO always talks only to one at a time, suspicion and envy may
arise among them as well (who does he listen to?)
.
An independent and loyal XO may minimize the effects
outlined above by being frank with the CO in his feedback and
by keeping the officers informed as best he can. It would be
of special importance that he makes it a rule to address them
as a group. Then each officer can be judged by the others on
the merit of his contributions, and accusations of favorite
picking can be prevented. However, in some cases the XO may
virtually be bypassed and the CO will choose one of the
department heads as his main advisor. In such situations even
those most loyal to the system will as XO have a hard time to
keep the officers together as a team and to succeed in main-
taining efficiency.
Another CO implements an almost opposite information
scheme. Before he gives any major address to the crew he briefs
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his officers thoroughly on the subjects and gives them ample
opportunity to ask questions. Hence, when a sailor comes to
his division officer, he will get straight answers. As a
consequence his regards for thrust and confidence in his
superiors will increase. Furthermore, this CO has a weekly
meeting with all his officers. An agenda is worked out in
advance based on proposals from himself, the XO, and the
officers. The XO is the coordinator. There is also a possi-
bility to bring up other subjects at the end of the meeting
when all formally listed items have been discussed. The CO
also requires his XO to schedule daily formal briefs with all
officers not on duty present in order to coordinate policies
and provide feedback. The XO on his part demands that the
division officers in turn meet at regularly scheduled times,
at least once a week, to debrief his division on general
matters and to give feedback on training progress. Quite often
the CO will listen in on the officers ' brief himself and the
department heads usually will participate in the division
meetings
.
Likewise the Officer of the Watch (00W) will formally
summon his officers and men to discuss progress and plan training
activities. On his weekly address the CO will always comment on
which of the three watches has performed best or made most
improvements that week.
Last, but not least, the supply officer who is the ship's
postmaster and the secretary of the Captain, has been ordered to
supply a daily list of incoming and outgoing mail. Correspondence
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that the CO or the XO think should be brought to the general
attention of all officers are put in a folder together with the
list. The Captain even requires the officers to initial the
list to indicate that they have read todays folder.
It should be fairly safe to predict that this informa-
ion scheme will contribute to improved teamwork among officers
id to increase the authority of younger officers
.
Next a classical example of communication fallacy will
>e presented. The 00W will have 2-3 junior officers of petty-
officers to assist him in his duties in harbor. They will divide
a 24 hour watch into on-duty and stand-by hours. The one on duty
will mostly stay on deck to supervise the ratings on guard or he
will be on inspection tours . Quite often some of the ratings
presently not on post will ask permission to run for one hour,
go to the post office, etc. Due to fire protection plans and
other reasons there is a minimum requirement on manpower to be
on standby duty. Hence, sometimes the assistant 00W will say no
to such requests. Not uncommonly the rating will then see the
00W and ask him. Unfortunately, sometimes the 00W will grant
permission without consulting or informing his assistant. If
this happens and the assistant does not bring the problem to
the attention of the 00W, then there is a high probability that
the procedure may be repeated. And before long the assistant's
authority will fade, and he will start neglecting his duties.
Furthermore, if the same thing happens to other assistants,




These are only two workable schemes in this case to
prevent such incidents from happening, that is:
(1) The 00W should never allow anybody to see him
except when it is arranged through the assistant on duty.
(2) The 00W meets the sailor and lets him present
his problem but tells him that he will be informed about the
decision via the assistant. Then he calls in his deputy and
asks his opinion, resolves the problem, and lets the assistant
take care of letting the sailor know.
At the very least the 00W should always keep the assistant
informed when he makes such approvals
.
Very little has been said about communication theory in
this section. Instead, the intention has been to illustrate some
possible communication fallacies in the environment of the frigate.
Hopefully, the examples also indicate the potential and importance
of the establishment of adequate information channels . It should
also be quite obvious that proper communication schemes are a
very crucial part of the success of leadership and organizational
effectiveness
.
The examples given are mainly based upon the experiences
jpf the author supplemented with ideas from the text by Captain
Helle. [23]
Somewhat related to the goal-setting and information
processes, are the process of decision making. A brief, rather




4 . The Process of Decision Making
The reader may recall that Vroom-Yetton in their model
listed three important considerations with regard to decision
u- [12]making:
(a) Technical Soundness
(b) Acceptance by Subordinates
(c) Time Available
C giBlegen and Nylen 1 describe the process of decision making as
an iterative search and selection scheme consisting of five
phases:
(1) Search for Problems
(2) Search for Alternatives
(3) Search for Consequences
(4) Comparison of Alternatives
(5) Decision by Choosing One Alternative
They summarized their views of the process in a model presented
in Figure 12.
The process of decision making is closely related to
goals, communication patterns, leadership styles and the structure
of the situation in which the decision is required. First of all
the problem which has been identified has to be recognized as
such by the decision maker. Next the time factor has to be
considered. In many structured situation as described under that
heading, there is no time to collect further information. The
information available has to be evaluated, combined with experience






































The Process of Decision Making. After Blegen and
Nylen.t 8 ' *• 120]
criteria will be met. The acceptance consideration plays a
relatively minor role in the technical-mechanical subsystem due
to the implied constraints, but is of the greatest importance
in decision making in the technical-organic subsystem. When
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the time factor is not significant, the communication process
becomes more important. If the CO is the one who will finally
decide, it can be seen from the model that it is quite important
with whom he consults. The officers and the Board of Advisors
for example, may have different opinions as well as objectives
attached to the problem to be resolved. Therefore, from an
acceptance point of view it is essential for the CO to identify
the motives underlying the proposals of those who give advice.
If he fails to take such input into proper consideration, he
may be in for a surprise when he orders the implementation.
Basically, the CO has to distinguish between (1) time
constraint and (2) other decisions. For the latter category
he should collect as much information as necessary to generate
an adequate comparison between representative alternatives and
their consequences. Last he should consider the soundness and
acceptance factors paying special attention to possible conflicts
of interest. If he can find alternatives that meet these criteria
and the requirements of the objective, he chooses the one he
regards as having the highest probability of success. If it is
impossible to meet the soundness and acceptance criteria at the
same time, the outcome of the implementation will depend heavily
upon his ability to "sell" his "sound" decision. That brings up
the question of motivation which is to be investigated next.
5. Motivation
In this section a review of some of the most important
theories of motivation will be given. The discussion is mainly
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based on the presentation found in reference [10] and supple-
mented by [21]
.
The non-volunteer conscription system has the negative
aspect that military service is an inescapable duty (as well as
the right) of any male citizen fulfilling the physical and
psychological minimum requirements . Motivation theories , there-
fore, are of interest to any commanding officer.
Of special prominence among the theories used to explain
motivation in organizations, is Maslow's hierarchical classifi-
cation of needs. He postulates the following five categor-
[24, p. 252]les: ^
(1) physiological (food, air, shelter).
(2) safety (security, stability and absence from
pain, threat or illness, etc.).
(3) belongingness (acceptance, friendship,
affection, love, and so on)
.
(4) esteem (feelings of achievement or self-worth,
and recognition or respect from others)
.
(5) self-actualization (becoming what one is capable
of becoming, that is, self-fulfillment or the realization of
one's potential).
These are four basic assumptions to be considered in
•J.X. *.u u- u [24, p. 252]connection with the hierarchy: c
(1) A satisfied need is not a motivator (another
need always emerges to take its place)
.
(2) The need network for most people is very complex




(3) Lower-level needs must be satisfied, in general,
jefore higher-level needs are activated sufficiently to drive
behavior
.
(4) There are many more ways to satisfy higher-
level needs than for lower level. (Note: Higher needs are
individually determined, i.e., culturally developed.)
It seems reasonable to suggest that an average subscripted sailor
who arrives onboard the frigate will first of all seek the
satisfaction of safety needs. Hence, he would like to learn
what is expected of him. He has to acquire job skills as well
as adjusting to the required pattern of accepted behavior in
the social system. In the absence of a proper introduction
program, he has to obtain the necessary knowledge by asking,
observing, and through feedback given to him. If not explained
the basic rules and norms, he will probably experience a chain
of negative feedback in the form of minor social sanctions
.
Therefore, from a motivational point of view it is very in-
efficient not to take good care of those who arrive and intro-
duce them properly.
As soon as the sailor feels reasonably secure, he will
probably strive for satisfaction of his belongingness and esteem
heeds. It was pointed out when the system levels model was
presented, that the status of membership group and the presence
of 1' esprit de corps are important factors in this connection.
If the membership in own group is so desirable that the group
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is also the reference group for the individual, then the possi-
bilities of satisfaction of belongingness and esteem needs of
the members should be excellent. This presumption again focuses
on the extreme importance of the group as a key to need satis-
faction and basis for organizational effectiveness.
The participation program is intended to assist the CO
in finding areas where the sailors may have an opportunity to
realize the self-actualization level.
Considering the trivialities of many duties that have to
be carried out on the ship and remembering the high average
educational level and professional training of the conscripted
crew members, it is not realistic to believe that it is possible
for everybody to attain that kind of need satisfaction. However,
the internal study referred to under the discussion of background
factors showed that ability to adjust and find satisfaction in
the services increased significantly with level of education.
Hence, maybe the prospects for the participation program are not
undesirable.
Another approach to motivation has been developed by
[24 1
Herzberg. L J This theory is quite controversial. The claim
is that some job factors lead to satisfaction (motivator factors)
while others can only prevent dissatisfaction (hygiene factors)
.
The most prominent motivator factors are achievement, recognition,
work itself, responsibility, and advancement. The hygiene factors
The group he identifies with for guidance regarding his
basic values and norms.
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include company policy and administration, supervision, salary,
interpersonal relations, and working conditions. For the leaders
of the frigate this theory indicates that efficient administra-
tive and fair treatment of subordinates in accordance with
regulations ' ' only provides a foundation for effective-
ness . Attention always should be placed on the motivator factors
whenever training programs are outlined and exercises planned.
Vroom's expectancy theory attempts to explain how behavior
is directed in order to reach a goal. The model is based on four
assumptions: 124 ' p * 267]
(1) Individuals have preferences for various outcomes
that are potentially available.
(2) Individuals have expectancies about the likelihood
that an action on their part will lead to intended behavior.
(3) People have certain instrumentalities (subjective
probabilities) about the likelihood that certain behaviors will
lead to the attainment of desirable outcomes.
(4) In any situation, the action a person chooses to
take is determined by the expectancies and the preferences that
person has at that time.
The CO should make sure that goals known to be highly desirable
to many sailors in certain situations are most easily obtained
by working for the organization. Unfortunately, rewards like
extra time-off for well-done jobs are more difficult to admin-
ister and apply than it used to be. The reason for this is that
the area of spare time, vacation, and paid trips home have
become so regulated that it is hard to justify more time off.
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Hence, it has not the same value as a motivator any longer.
In Figure 13 an attempt has been made to present the different














Figure 13 An Integrated Model of Motivation,
and Schwab, 19 73. tl4]
After Cummings
The aspect of human energy is closely related to moti-
vation. Suppose two persons, X and Y, with exactly the same
potential of energy resources, have to carry out a task. X is
strongly motivated to do the job; Y is not. In Figure 14 the
outer circles indicate their total energy resources, while the
inner circles symbolize the energy available for their assigned
tasks. After a while they have each used a certain fraction
of the available energy (shaded part) . Even though Y has burned
less energy is absolute terms (area of shaded part) , he has used
up a greater portion relatively speaking. Therefore, subjec-
r c -|
tively he will feel more tired than X.
Next, let one individual be assigned two different tasks.
Figure 15 tells that the person is very tired (even exhausted)
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' P* 234 ^
with regard to Task I. However, he has some energy left for
Task II. Only a small part of the energy used on Task I influences
the availability of energy for Task II
.
Figure 15 Ratio Between Fatigue in Connection with One Task
and Available Energy for Another Task (Subjective
Fatigue). After Bjoervik. [6 ' p * 235]
Considering the last illustration, it seems reasonable to conclude
that variation in job assignment or rotation of task, may be a
necessity from a pure energy point of view. [6] This observation
brings up the question of job design and enrichment. Thorsrud
r 47 I











(1) Content and variation.
(2) Job requirements should be known.
(3) Something to learn.
(4) Something to decide.
(5) Job respect.
(6) Job-connected with the surroundings.
(7) Desired future (included no promotion)
.
Presuming that the frigate has finished the basic training
period, it should be ample opportunity for any innovative CO or
officer to find ways to apply the principles listed above. In
brief, the ability to utilize the potential of human energy
depends just as much upon imaginative thinking as upon insight
and understanding of motivation theories. That quite naturally
leads the way into the art or science of leadership.
6. Leadership
Within the domain of leadership, there are several major
schools of thought. Their approaches to the analysis of the
functions of the leader vary considerably. An excellent survey
r 45 ]is given by Stogdill in his "Handbook of Leadership." 1 J The
author regards the contingency approach to be the most fruitful
way of attacking the problem from an applied point of view. In
accordance with that, a presentation of two of the leading con-
tingency theories are given in Appendix A. The practical use-
fulness of each one is examined and compared. For further dis-
cussion, see Appendix A and references [19, 51]. Vroom and
Yetton L J single out three factors which they claim is especially
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important in influencing the ultimate effectiveness of deci-
sions:
(1) The quality or rationality of the decision.
(2) The acceptance or commitment on the part of
.ubordinates to execute the decision effectively.
(3) The amount of time available or required to
make the decision.
Any leader should understand the significance of these
aspects of the decision-making process. It focuses on the fact
that a decision which is clearly the best one according to some
optimality criteria, might turn out to be hopelessly suboptimal
and impossible to implement effectively because of poor judgment
in selecting the decision rule.
Next, the usual military definition of leadership will
r 55 l
be given. It is phased as follows: 1 J
Leadership may be defined as the art, science, or gift
by which a person is enabled and privileged to direct the thoughts,
plans and actions of others in such a manner as to command their
obedience, their confidence, their respect, and their loyal
cooperation
.
It seems reasonable to interpret the phrase "art, science
or gift" as ability. Equally successful leaders in similar sit-
uations may vary substantially in the way they go about conducting
their functions as a leader. No best recipe exists. Some
succeed because they have special gifts, usually called charisma,
which makes them natural leaders. Others become leaders due to
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experience or special insights in a particular field or through
appointment to positions which furnish formal authority and
powers. In most cases knowledge in the subjects of social
science will undoubtedly provide useful help to any leader.
A naval commander has tremendous powers, He even has
the right and duty to undertake missions that may cost the
lives of all his subordinates and his own as well. ' ' '
15 247 21
'
J The fact that lives are involved makes the naval
leader's tasks quite different from that of a civilian manager.
It adds an extra dimension to the consideration of moral respon-
sibility. This is the reason why a commanding officer has to
demand absolute obedience and loyalty. t49, 115 ' 116/ 120] It is
a consequence of (1) the structure of the task, (2) the time
element involved, and (3) the fatality of failure.
Even though a CO is given his "formal powers by appoint-
ment, every person with such authority has to earn the confidence
and respect of his subordinates to become leader in the meaning
of the military definition. It requires the ability to be
absolutely authoritarian in the structured situations and at
the same time be flexible enough to allow maximum participation
from everybody when no such constraints are present.
This aspect is superbly treated by H. H. Kirst




Any CO should always work hard to improve his own
qualifications to tackle his part of the job. He also has the
responsibility to ensure that his subordinates know their tasks,
and are trained properly to match the requirements of their
[49,§§117, 126]positions. '
When the officers, and the CO in particular, show that
they care for their men and take their business seriously, it
should not be too hard to succeed in producing a reasonably
effective unit. The sailors expect that their leaders (1) do
their best to learn to know them, (2) guide them when they are
ignorant, (3) punish them for wrongdoings (4) recognize jobs
well done, (5) reward them for excellence, (6) respect them as
individuals, (7) protect their integrity as human beings, (8) give
them fair treatment. [49.S115, 1", 119-123, 126, 127] The ^^
paragraphs referred to is not much more than formalized common
sense and observance of an acceptable code of behavior. Con-
r§ 129]
cerning suitable conduct, NAVKEG "" explicity talk about
the use of alcohol. Unfortunately, the drinking customs of
the Navy are quite different from those recognized as respectable
by many social groups in the Norwegian society. There are quite
a few people of officer rank who have been in the Navy for such
£ long time that they fail to consider this point. According
r 16
1
to the Leadership and Education Manual, L J conscripted sailors
do not expect their officers to be any kind of supermen. However,
they do react negatively if their leaders are observed sense-
lessly drunk even though it is on their spare time. Most of them
will associate such kind of behavior with the local drunkards
they used to see back home. And that comparison is no basis to
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build respect and confidence upon. With the possible exception
of a few leaders given extraordinary charismatic powers, no
officer who really takes his responsibilities seriously can
afford to ignore the importance of certain accepted norms that
the civilian population and many of the conscripted sailors
value highly. Such violations will always have negative con-
sequences for the individual leader involved. It will also hurt
the reputation of the Navy as an institution. Even the best
ones could have been even better if this fact was observed.
In the present reality, the military definition of
leadership has the weakness of focusing too much on the leader's
position. His authority and its powers could almost be inter-
preted to have divine qualities. However, many individuals
react very strongly at the bare possibility that the formula-
tion might be based on such reasoning. Besides, the definition
r 37 ]implicitly supports. the so-called X-theory of McGregor which
;
assumes that there are people of two categories so to speak,
the leaders and the followers . That point of view is not
acceptable to most members of todays Norwegian society, even
though absolute subordination obviously is required between
the levels of hierarchy and authority present on the
frigate. 1 14, §151, §153]
A naval leader probably should focus more on his duties
r 23
1
and responsibilities than on his privileges to be successful.
If he for example uses his position to stay in bed after all his
subordinates are required by the routine to be at work, that
will hurt his position as a leader. Especially if this occurs




night before. Any leader that does not follow the rules by
which he demands his subordinates to live will most certainly
experience difficulty in earning respect and confidence. A
strong point of the given definition is that it explicitly
states some basic conditions that are necessary to succeed as
a leader. Accomplishment can only be achieved through the
dedication and ability of followers. Hence, the style,
attitudes, and values of the leader (i.e., his personality)
fl9 1play a decisive part in the leadership function. Fiedler
has tried to capture a combination of these effects in an
aggregate personality measure he calls the least-preferred
co-worker (LPC) score. The extreme points of his measurement
scale is task orientation and relation orientation. (See
Appendix A or reference.) But Fiedler's approach is not
static, he considers the interactions with group as well as
the structure of the task. An alternative definition of leader-
ship that takes the dynamic aspects into account is given by
Tannenbaum, Weschler and Masaryle ' ^* and goes as follows:
"Leadership is interpersonal influence, exercised in a situation
and directed, through the communication process, toward the
attainment of a specified goal(s) ." Hence, the definition
suggests that leadership involves attempts on the part of a
leader (influencer) to affect (influence) the behavior of a
follower (influencee) or followers in a situation.
The CO may regard this definition as a guidance for
everyday leadership in the subsystem that has been called the
technical-organic. Basically, this constitutes the application
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of proven administrative techniques, experience rules of thumb,
good judgment, flexibility, and common sense to build the basis
for respect and confidence required by the military definition.
However, the military definition should also be remembered to
remind the CO of his unique responsibility as compared to that
of the manager, his right and duty to complete his mission at
the cost of human lives.
All the schools of thought in the area of leadership
have something valuable to contribute to the overall under-
standing of how to go about achieving common goals. Hence,
leaders should study and pay attention to all contributions,
their approach, and points of view.
However, it is equally important that the leader:
(1) Understand his own motivational structure as
well as his strong and weak sides as a leader. In that
r 19 1process Fiedler's LPC-score measurement can be helpful. J
(2) Develop his ability to integrate and apply
his knowledge in a practical situation. That is where the
simplistic model of Vroom-Yetton can prove to be very useful
.
This discussion of leadership has been very fractional.
However, the purpose has been to show that there is no simple
road to follow to be a successful leader. But as a rule of
thumb it seems reasonable to expect that:
(1) consideration and respect for the integrity of
followers,
(2) compassion for the needs of subordinates,
(3) geniune dedication to the mission given,
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(4) professionalism in the "technical" aspects
of the job,
(5) hard and determined efforts to achieve the
stated goals,
(6) knowledgment of own limitations, and
(7) belief in the ability of the subordinates
in most cases will yield satisfactory results for the CO.
Furthermore, it should be quite obvious that two of the most
likely paths to failure for a CO are to put too much one-sided
emphasis on:
(1) the organizational goals fend ignore the needs
of subordinates)
.
(2) having a good time and happy relations (without,
at the same time, stressing imposed or implied objectives enough
to give the crew an opportunity to become professional)
.
Summary
The examination of organizational variables started with
a discussion of structure which was defined as "relatively stable
patterns that exist over time in a system." It was shown that
some of the most vital functions of the frigate require rigid
jommand structure to meet the time constraint imposed by the
requirements of the situation. It was also suggested, with
support from published research findings, that such extreme
structure implies mechanical organization. Since there is no
freedom of choice for the operators at the bottom of the chain,
>thing is left to be decided and lack of firmly established
irocedures will, therefore, only tend to create dissatisfaction.
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However, when the objectives are explicitly and clearly stated,
it seems to be much easier to establish meaningful cooperation
with subordinates since everybody has a common frame of reference.
Thereafter, the goal-setting process was considerd. Of
special importance was the fact that unambiguous objectives
tend to increase the autonomy of the individual officer. He is
told what, but not how. Concerning areas where goals were not
precisely defined as operational objectives, those involved
could be viewed as searching for a common agreement that would
provide a minimum benefit to all participants
.
The third aspect discussed was the communication process.
It was pointed out that channels can be one of two ways, and
that to listen is just as valuable as speaking. Perceptual
bias was also considered.
However, the main emphasis was on the presentation of a
few hopefully relevant and illustrative examples in relation
to the frigate
.
Next, a very brief introduction was given of the process
of decision making followed by motivation considerations. A
very broad overview of the theories of Maslow, Herzberg, and
Vroom were presented and some implications discussed. Expe-
cially the importance of concrete feedback and the fact that
motivation is individually determined. The latter aspect was
illustrated through a brief discussion of the human problem
of energy which in turn suggested job enrichment through job-
rotation as a reasonable approach. Finally, some observations
regarding leadership were made. It was pointed out that a
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broader presentation of two important theories can be found
in Appendix A. The important factors to remember in decision
making were:
(a) rationality of decision.
(b) implementation.
(c) time available.
Two definitions of leadership were given, one of which was
the most used military one. Some implications of this definition
were examined. It was found to be quite static, but provides
good guidance as to what underlying conditions have to be met
before success as a leader can be expected. The dynamic defi-
nition emphasized the interpersonal influence in a situation to
reach a goal. Finally, an attempt was made to show that there
is a profound difference between management and military leader-
ship based on the fact that a CO has the powers to obtain his
goals by sacrificing human lives
.
This summary concludes this section concerning models of
organizational behavior as applied to the frigate. In the
continuation the main effort will be put into presenting various
organizational development techniques and schemes the CO can
consider to apply to improve the output of his ship.
108

IV. TIME-PHASED ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS
In the preceding sections many theories and models have
been introduced and applied to the analysis of the external
and internal organizational environments of the frigate. Even
though it has been emphasized that the observations made by no
means guarantee the correct answer to the question of how to
obtain optimal efficiency, an attempt will be made in this
section to integrate the insights gained into an organization
development (OD) scheme based on time-sequenced phases. The
point of view will again be that of a CO trying to fulfill his
mission.
However, before starting to develop the time-phased
approach, the question of a unified leadership policy within
the Navy as a supersystem ought to be considered.
A. SUPERSYSTEM LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY
There seems to be a need in any large organization to con-
tinuously review the policy of delegation of authority. There
should always be harmony between the responsibilities of a
r 23 1position and the actual authority given to the occupant.
Hence, the Navy should closely watch its policy concepts re-
garding command of warships
.
During World War II Admiral E. J. King worked very hard to
make his flag officers and other force commanders appreciate
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the vital importance of training commanding officers under
their command to show initiative and take the responsibility
for independent action. He stressed that officers in a position
of command never should be told "how," only "what" and maybe
"when" and "where." In addition, "why" should usually be added
to ensure intelligent cooperation. He pointed out that if such
officers are not given the opportunity to think, judge, and
decide on their own in peacetime, they will get accustomed to
detailed instructions and will be afraid to handle situations
without specific orders in time of war. Admiral King, further-
more, asked his flag officers to be satisfied with acceptable
solutions even if they did not meet the requirements of
perfect, formal staff work. J
It may be that Admiral King's viewpoints are even more
valid today. It is technically possible for a Naval commander
to have the radar picture of his ships transmitted directly to
his ©mmand center. He may, therefore, at his own discretion
overlook, say, the navigation of any ship in his area. Moni-
toring of this type combined with detailed operational orders
•removes decision making requirements from the commander at sea.
This type of operational environment will very likely result
in COs with little ability to judge a given situation inde-
pendently and take appropriate action. The question of in-
centives for the CO which are not in conflict with the real
requirements of the organization as discussed in Section IIIB
is of central importance.
Any development in the direction of excessive monitoring
should continuously be watched carefully in the Navy. Actually,
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there have been questions related in consequence to this
problem in the RNoN. A few years ago, the outcome of trials
in court of COs who grounded their ships seemed to be quite
arbitrary. This was mostly due to the fact that such cases
came up in different jurisdictional areas and the lack of a
common understanding of the difference between a warship in
a tactical exercise and a merchantman underway from A to B.
Since then a commission has been appointed to treat all major
incidents where warships are involved in order to ensure fair
and equal treatment. Each year the commission publishes some
of its findings. These selected examples function as guide-
lines. The commission has paid attention to such aspects as
presented above as it should. It is a fact that for several
months each year the Norwegian coast is stormy, dark, and
unfriendly. Very often there is plenty of snow, rain or fog.
These are the environmental factors the Norwegian Navy will
have to face in time of war. One of the advantages this Navy
is supposed to have compared to a possible intruder is the
knowledge of the leads and training in utilizing acquired
insights to tactical advantage. However, the development of
such very practical skills heavily depends upon the realism
that is allowed the Naval officers in their conduct of
exercises. If the rule is to penalize severely for accidents
even if they happen only occasionally, the COs obviously will
become careful and first of all concentrate on safety before
any training benefits of responsible calculated risks are
considered. Even though reckless action never can be approved
and hence has to be condemned, the Navy probably would significantly
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benefit in efficiency in the long run from a rather liberal
policy regarding groundings and similar happenings. Such
random accidents should be viewed as an unavoidable part of
a realistic program to develop COs of tactical excellence.
Considering the question of unified leadership philosophy,
the Navy should perhaps consider allowing the Inspector
General of the Navy and a few top operational Navy commanders
to take part in a two or three day seminar with officers due
to have important commands at sea. Participants ought to be
designated squadron and division commanders plus captains of
frigates and other larger craft of the Norwegian Navy. A
seminar like the one suggested could provide inspiration and
give a sense of purpose to participating officers . Case
studies also tend to give the members of the work group a close
to common perception of how to analyze problems that resemble
the ones examined. In fact, it has been suggested that
learning is a conditioning of future responses. Hence, a
program as proposed could enable the Navy leadership to
influence future actions of the participants indirectly. At
least, the introduction of a CO's preparation seminar should
increase the probability of coherency in the Navy's reactions
to similar stimulus situations.
Summary
The Navy leadership should recognize the need for COs who
are independent and determined in the conduct of their duties.
In this context it is of crucial importance that each CO sees
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his mission in the correct perspective. It should be understood
that unnecessary, detailed instructions and monitoring very
likely may develop cautious, relatively insecure leaders who
would tend to wait for further orders instead of acting on
their own judgment. If such bureaucratic attitudes dominate
the oeprative leaders of the Navy, it most certainly will have
a significant detrimental effect on efficiency and confidence
of the Navy's capabilities. Therefore, a CO preparation
seminar should be considered.
In the following section some of the major problems a new
CO has to face on assuming command will be examined. The reader
should throughout this section refer to the relevant parts of
preceding discussions.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRIGATE AS AN ORGANIZATION
Before considering how the results from preceding examina-
tions and additional recommendations from the NAVREG can be
applied to develop a suitable organizational development (OD)
scheme for the frigate, a summary of the task of the CO will
be presented. Let E(X) represent efficiency and C symbolize
the level of the frigate's total budget. Then the problem of
the CO is:
Maximize E(X) - C X =
'
(X1# • • • xn )
Subject to gi (X){-, =, -} b., i = 1, 2, ..., m
where m is the number of constraints, n equals the number of
variables (systems and functions) , and b. symbolizes expenditures
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allowed or other limitations within various subsectors. For
example:
g, (X) - b, may indicate the approved number of gunnery
shells of a certain caliber which is made available to be spent
in practice during a certain time period, say, one year. The
constraint g2 (X) - b~ could represent the minimum required
hours of leisure time an officer is entitled to have in a row
each week. In other words, the CO's problem is to maximize
efficiency within the feasible region left when all different
constraints have been accounted for. Hence, the less leadway
the Navy and other supersystems offer him, the less likely it
is that he will think and decide independently and act force-
fully in accordance with the situational demands.
The situations facing the CO can vary. For example, he may
assume command at different stages in the life cycle of the
frigate. The ship can either just be ready to leave the ship-
yard as an entirely new construction or it may have finished
a refit period, or it can be in, say, the start of its opera-
tional phase. For each case the problems the CO has to handle
will be different. Likewise, the manpower resources available
will deviate in quality.
In the discussions in this section the following scenario
will be selected (other possibilities will not be presented)
:
a. The frigate has completed a programmed refit period.





c. Standard operational objectives are provided for
all functions and systems.
d. All officers and petty officers have a basic
theoretical background in social science subjects either through
courses during basic training or they have attended leadership
seminars in ongoing Navy programs
.
The CO may find the input-output model helpful with regard
to the task-oriented discussion of his leadership problem. This
model (Figure 6) can easily be extended to include the dimension
of time. Then the model serves two purposes:
(1) It can be applied at every transient stage of
development to evaluate output against expected performance in
that phase.
(2) Through the subsystems of coordination, control,
and maintenance, progress towards the goal of establishing an
operational unit of required standard can be continuously moni-
tored, and weak areas can be identified and subsequently
strengthened in the pursuit of the fully developed frigate.
Considering the human relations aspect, the Systems Level
Model could provide a useful reference for the CO. This model
focuses on the fact that to be concerned only with accomplish-
ment or only with human relations probably is not the best way
to proceed (Figure 3)
.
In brief, a new CO has to pay attention to many constraints.
Hence, it would be valuable for most captains to have developed
a general strategy of how to go about fulfilling the objectives
expected of him. Such a strategy is called an organizational
development (OD) model and is usually divided into development
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phases. The discussions of models and variables of the frigate
should, when combined with experience and the recommendations of
the NAVREG, supply a reasonable platform on which any CO should
be able to base his own plan.
It will be presumed that the CO has identified some major
stages in the evolution of the frigate's capabilities and that
he has decided on a stepwise, sequential approach with different
emphasis on priorities in the various phases as illustrated in
Figure 16
.
1. Basic Decisions of Policy
I The CO has to make up his mind regarding how he, in
general terms, wants to go about running the ship. For example,
he has to consider the need for a dual leadership function.
Therefore, he should consult with his XO and determine at least
broadly how he wants their functions divided between them. Any
CO has to acknowledge that the way he involves the XO will have
a profound influence on their relationship and leadership roles.
The processes of communication, goal setting, and decision making
as well as the establishment of structural patterns will very
much depend on his attitude toward the status of the XO. The
discussions in Sections IIIA, IIIB, IIIC, and the NAVREG, Part I,
Chapters 1 and 3, have a strong bearing on the problems of this
phase
.
2. Establishment of Teamwork Among Officers
Next, the CO has to give initial guidance to his officers,
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117

action of the officers within their areas of responsibilities
have to be established in broad terms. During this phase at
least the following policies should be resolved:
a. Standard introduction program for the ratings
covering general norms and rules of behavior, emergency proce-
dures, basic combat readiness requirements, watchkeeping duties,
etc.
b. Responsibilities and authority of the Officer of
the Watch at sea and in harbor.
c. Formal communication structure for various classes
and types of information.
d. Procedures for planning of exercises, sailing and
maintenance programs, debriefs, etc., between the CO/XO and
the officers.
e. Broad guidelines for similar formalized briefs and
feedback sessions wtihin divisions and departments.
f
.
How should bad conduct on behalf of the sailors be
reported and investigated for the purpose of disciplinary action?
g. Apart from the required meetings, what should be the
use of the Board of Advisors? What type of problems should be
referred to the Board, and which ones should be handled adminis-
tratively through the chain of command?
The above represent a small sample with many other im-
portant areas requiring consideration. The CO can choose
between many different approaches to establish the policies he
wants. He should pay close attention to his own personality
characteristics, his usual style, and most significantly, how
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he wants to accomplish his mission. A few possible options open
to the CO will be presented. However, before he decides, the CO
should carefully study Part I, Chapter 5 and ^"as well as Part II,
Chapters 3-10 of the NAVREG and make the officers do the same.
a. He could simply submit detailed written orders and
mainly deal with his officers through the XO in business matters.
This approach will create a distant CO and put the XO in the
power position. The latter can determine what the CO shall know
(at least to a certain extent) by filtering information. The
other way around he can interpret and modify orders and informa-
tion given by the CO to be passed on.
b. The CO can lecture his officers in an attempt to
sell his program. He may supplement this by answering questions
and by giving out written orders as well. He will have inter-
action with his officers, but the communication will mainly be
one sided. Hence, there is a strong possibility that the CO
will run the show and that he may develop a group of followers
i
lacking the initiative and will to take individual action.
c. He could invite the officers to participate in the
development of policies under his and the XO's supervision.
The CO can basically go for one of two approaches here. He
can either accept a concensus type of proposal as a policy, or
he can regard any recommendations as a suggestion and always
reserve for himself (or as specified by his delegation of
authority for the XO) to make the final judgment as to which
alternative to choose. Practically, one way to go about this
'is the following:
(1) The officers are divided into work groups.
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(ii) Each work group can study problems related
to the area where a policy is to be implemented (prepared by
XO/CO) .
(iii) Groups present their proposals.
(iv) Discussion, generalization, and conclusion.
In addition to activating the officers, the discussions may
develop rules and norms that they feel more obligation towards
than otherwise would have been the case since they have partici-
pated in developing them. Hence, subjects like the following
ones could be useful to address in the groups:
(a) What is required of an officer's behavior
and his drinking habits?
(b) If possible, come up with a proposal to
establish improved policies in the area formerly covered by the
old CO Policy Order #5. (By treating all important orders this
way, the CO has a pretty good guarantee that his officers under-
stand the spirit as well as content of his orders.)
It has been hypothesized that learning tends to condition
future responses. Hence, it appears that this approach might
help to establish a basis for coherency in policy interpreta-
tion among officers.
Additional benefit could be obtained from this approach if
the CO and the XO discretely observe the groups at work. It is
the experience of the author that the information gained about
The author worked with group development as an in-
structor at the Norwegian Naval Academy.
120

individuals when watching their behavior in a work group is
quite astonishing. Besides, the officers themselves probably
would learn to know each other quite well in a few days of
group activities.
3. Group Development and Implementation of Policies
In this phase the ratings will arrive and the imple-
mentation of the policies decided upon will start. There will
be a program of the day and a program of the week to be followed.
Emphasis will be on:
a. Introducing the new sailors to the unfamiliar en-
vironment through the programs prepared during Phase 2
.
b. Attempting to develop the formal groups into becoming
primary groups for the sailors as discussed in detail under the
presentation of the systems level model.
c. Teaching the sailors the fundamental skills in their
primary combat roles plus the basics of their watchkeeping duties.
Introduction to the importance of drill.
It is necessary in all phases that the CO, XO, and the
officers supervise closely at their respective levels since feed-
back is of such importance for learning. However, at this stage
careful monitoring is crucial. All possible measures should be
taken to maximize participation in scheduled activities by
superiors. That way, control and coordination can be kept tight
enough so that deviations from agreed policies can be discovered
and corrected immediately.
Reference should continue to be made to NAVREG, Part I,
Chapters 5-7, and Part II, Chapters 4-7.
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4. Growth, of Groups and Intergroup Relations
It was anticipated during the examination of the needs
of the crew that as soon as the ratings feel relatively secure
they will start striving for belonging and status . The internal
development of the groups is still very important and should
always be watched closely. In addition to the factors mentioned
in the discussion of the group as a system level, the CO should
look out for technical and administrative improvements that
deprive the officers of opportunities for natural interactions
with their subordinates. One example could be that more "effi-
cient" schemes have been implemented to pay the sailors their
monetary allowance. According to NAVREG (§605) , each department
head is responsible for collecting the money and handing it out
to the individual sailors in his department. This is a very
favorable situation to meet with the crew members. He may
initiate some small talk, ask the sailors how they are coming
along or about their families. In short, it is a possibility
to get better acquainted that should not be abandoned in favor
of claims of efficiency. In fact, if implementated, centralized
payment might be an example of suboptimalization.
A second case could be if a junior officer serving as
assistant to the XO has to investigate all bad conduct reports
regardless of department. For the officer involved, such an
assignment could become a major part of his duties. It could be
administratively efficient in a bureaucratic sense, but it would
deprive the division officers of an occasion to take care of
their men, be helpful, and show concern. Another aspect carries
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even more weight; it is the fact that the officers lose an
opportunity to acquaint themselves with the individual situation
involving their men. Hence, from a leadership point of view,
the division officers should take care of the investigation of
misconduct of their own subordinates. The XO will have to
supervise to ensure fair treatment. However, that can be
accomplished by always requiring a written explanation signed by
the offender and his division officer. Department heads should
probably also interview each one of their troublemakers. In
such cases strict procedures might have a preventive effect in
themselves, showing that the officers care and try to find out
what the sailor's problem is. Besides, it indicates that bad
conduct is taken seriously by all superiors.
In order to maintain a favorable, within-group development,
intergroup competitions should be encouraged in sports and other
areas of welfare. This is also a good time to try to establish
a ship's band and to organize secondary groups like soccer teams,
bridge club, etc.
Likewise, in the functional areas the sailors should be
acquainted with the operational requirements of their system by
being introduced to the specified objectives. Integration of
individual efforts should begin to take shape through increased
coordination. Drill should be stressed in all programs to make
the sailors become professional in their duties. However, per-
formance should still be evaluated at the single ship level and
single ship activities given priority. Desired behavior should
be reinforced as much as possible. On the other hand, explanations
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have to be applied to correct poor performance due to mis-
understanding and lack of knowledge. However, willful wrong-
doings should be punished by consistent use of appropriate
sanctions. In this phase sailors will typically try to ignore
the uniform of the day order, and cooks will not bother to
change to proper attire before entering the deck to look at
the scenery when the frigate is proceeding out or into harbor.
These are minor offenses, and the officers often find it
difficult to motivate themselves to care. However, it is an
experience which many officers share that if the uniform rules
and other individually, relatively unimportant things are
enforced absolutely, other requirements often seem to be met
more easily, with less effort, and hence more effectively. As
a rule, it usually helps to keep the officers more eager if the
XO, each time he discovers violations, not only corrects the
sailor, but also consequently confronts the responsible
officer with a question why.
5. Internal Participation and Cooperation with Other Units
At this stage debriefs and planning sessions should
always be conducted with reference to stated objectives. Short-
comings should be pointed out and alternative training schemes
should be considered in order to improve performance. All
possible efforts should be made to engage the ratings in this
process. Evaluation of own performance and participation in the
planning of training activities including suggestions regarding
priorities should provide ample opportunities for interested
crew members to influence programs. Likewise, crosstraining and
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job rotation ought to be started for reasons explained in the
examination of the human energy problem in Section IIIC.
If the CO finds it suitable he could also consider
delegating more specific authority to the Board of Advisors.
He could, for example, put the Board in charge of introducing
different unit symbols and to start a ship's newspaper. The
need for identification with the unit will increase since the
emphasis in exercises will shift from single ship activities
toward cooperation with other units.
At the end of this phase a first visit of a team of
inspectors would be appropriate. External feedback would
provide a basis for a critical review of policies and programs.
Weaknesses in important details may easily be overlooked in
internal evaluations simply because of habit.
6 . Operational Period
The five first phases may be said to constitute a basic
training period. The frigate starts its operational life in
the sixth phase. Considerable improvements are still possible
in many areas, especially regarding routine and professionalism,
but the frigate usually functions reasonably efficiently as a
fighting unit at this stage, both internally and as a part of
a combat force. Presuming satisfactory leadership, the opera-
tional cycle is characterized by a steadily maturing of the crew
and a parallel consolidation and improvement in overall standards
of performance. More and more procedures and functions will
become routine and the maintenance of motivation will emerge as
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a central problem. The emphasis on participation and job
rotation programs has to be increased to meet this challenge.
Support and encouragement should also be given to all initiatives
aimed at creating additional meaningful leisure activities for
the crew members
.
Internal as well as external evaluations should be
integrated stages in this phase. The evaluation process should
be repeated on a cyclic basis, say, monthly.
However, each time there is a change of crew members,
the pattern will be interrupted and a loop backwards is necessary
to train the newly arrived in basic skills that the other crew
members already have acquired. This is a major problem area of
the operational stage. Hence, it is estremely important to have
a proper introduction program to ensure rapid integration of new
sailors. First of all they should be made to feel welcome and
secure. Usually it would be a good approach to let the sailors
in their group explain the functional aspects of their jobs.
In that way, everybody can indicate their own domain and make
the process of establishing the informal hierarchy in the group
as short and painless as possible. Every officer should be
aware of the fact that a power struggle for status positions
always takes place when new members arrive. Actually, it would
probably be an excellent participation scheme to let each
division work out its own detailed introduction program within
the framework of a CO order giving the general guidelines.
The introduction and training of new crew members is
the most important event in the operational phase besides main-
taining motivation and ability to reveal weak spots through self
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evaluation. However, change of operational command may also
initiate new requirements and alter priorities . Area commanders
could have slightly different views regarding objectives or
the mission could be different as a consequence of operational
conditions and environment.
The six phases presented above could just as well have
been perceived and listed differently. Adjacent phases extend
into one another and one phase is not necessarily finished
before the next starts. The main point is that focus should
be changed as the capabilities of the crew members evolve.
Increasing abilities develop new needs of higher order to be
satisfied. It is crucial to recognize this evolution to succeed
in maintaining and improving the quality of output.
Summary
The mission of the CO was reviewed and presented in symbolic
form as an optimization problem followed by a description of
the scenario on which the considerations of the frigate * s phases
of development rest. Furthermore, it was presumed that the
CO would apply the input-output model and the system levels
model to guide him when preparing his strategy of organizational
development; one model primarily useful for task-oriented evalu-
ations, the other mainly applicable to the human aspect of the
system.
The CO identified six different development phases. Figure 16
gives an overview of the various stages and the areas of focus in




(1) Basic decisions of policy.
(2) Establishment of teamwork among officers.
(3) Group development and implementation of
(4) Growth of groups and intergroup relations.
(5) Internal participation and cooperation with
other units.
(6) Operational period.
Throughout each phase new crew members may arrive . That
always creates problems and requires a return to more basic
training to give the new sailors an opportunity to acquire all
necessary skills. However/ change of crew most commonly takes
place in the operational period. In order to maintain effective-
ness, a well-planned introduction program is invaluable. Last,
the extremely important role played by drill and feedback in the
process of producing efficient, confident, and professional crew-
members should again be pointed out.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section a brief overview of the study will be given
followed by some concluding and normative remarks regarding
lessons learned of how a commanding officer (CO) could go about
integrating knowledge available from various sources of be-
havioral sciences and the General Regulations of the Royal
Norwegian Navy (NAVREG) . It represents an attempt to establish
a scheme which is flexible enough to make it possible to main-
tain effectiveness even under conditions requiring substantial
internal responses to satisfy demands caused by frequent changes
in the external environment of the system which is subject to
analysis.
A. SUMMARY
Initially it was hypothesized that profound and relatively
rapid changes in the surroundings had created strong needs for
internal adjustments in the RNoN. Old schemes that had worked
satisfactorily before no longer suffice to produce efficient
results. Major changes in value orientation in the general
population and universal conscription have had an effect on the
within-Navy environment.
The study was limited to a treatment of the situation of a
commanding officer of a frigate in the RNoN. The intent was to
analyze possible approaches that appeared to provide a reasonable
12^

chance for the CO to accomplish successful completion of his
mission under the given circumstances.
The analysis was based upon the following three assumptions:
1. The frigate as a technological system is given.
2. The CO is in change of a real life experiment called
an identity simulation.
3. Organizational requirements cannot be met effectively
if they prevent individual need satisfaction of the crew members.
First, an analysis of the frigate as a system was carried out.
Background factors such as attributes of the social groups present
on the ship were examined. The formal functional and operational
organizations of the frigate were presented, and the influence of
officer organizations and the Board of Advisors were discussed.
Next, two models of the frigate were developed. The system
levels model provided a frame for discussions of individual need
structure and need satisfaction (individual level) , the social
function of groups and group development (group level) , and the
purpose of the frigate as an organization (organizational level)
.
» Thereafter, the social consequences of the given technological
structure were considered. Indications were that the technological
system combined with the objectives of the organization pretty much
determine the social structure of the work system. Possible
schemes to prevent or at least reduce the negative aspects of
this observation were examined within the reference of a socio-
technical input-output model. The effect of changes in factors
outside the frigate was also taken into account.
Following this, theories concerning organizational variables
and processes were presented and their applications looked at in
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the context of the frigate. The content of Appendix A is
closely related to the considerations of this section. In the
appendix two leadership theories viewed as highly relevant are
being compared and valued for practical application.
In the final part of the study, the task of the CO was
viewed as consisting of a series of tirae-sequenced stages.
Each phase identified was presumed to be subject to particular
problems that should be given special attention and treatment.
The previously presented models and recommendations from NAVREG
were used to facilitate the analysis of difficulties and to
provide guidance to what the proper action should be. In spite
of this, no single, unique answer to the question of how to
proceed could be supplied. Various alternatives were described
and considered at each stage. However, the final responsibility
for making the normative judgments must rest with the CO
because he always has to take into account that choices should




It is by no means straight forward to state what the measure
of effectiveness of a warship should be in peacetime. This fact
quite strongly suggests the need for a clearly stated policy by
the Navy leadership to provide the necessary purpose and guidance
in this matter. The commanding officer should be told what is
expected of him and his unit. Based upon the discussions of
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these factors, it seems reasonable to recommend that the
following programs should be given priority in the RNoN:
a. A seminar conducted at high level aiming at giving
the COs a proper, current perspective of their mission.
b. The establishment of specific objectives for
operation and maintenance of all functions and systems
.
However, the individual CO will still have to consider in
each case the resources made available to him including his own
capabilities before he makes up his mind of how to go about
developing his unit. Then, it is obviously important that he
has a sense of direction and a correct understanding of his
goals
.
In his search for optimal solutions, theoretical models
could prove to be useful support for the CO despite the fact
that no such model can supply the final answer to the problem
of producing the effective -frigate. Models, however, provide
valuable references within which to plan, conduct, and analyze
experiments intended to bring about functional and social
improvements. Models also furnish structure which facilitates
communication of requirements and feedback of results. The
presence of operational objectives are desirable for the same
reason. Hence, it seems natural that the Navy should consider
to:
a. Encourage and train COs and officers to use
theoretical models, objectives, and NAVREG recommendations to




b. Implement a system of inspection and supervision
to supply external feedback by establishing functional teams
of inspectors
.
c. Educate high level officers to put proper weight
in relevant areas when evaluating the COs, i.e., performance vs.
objectives, so as to prevent misguidance by feedback stressing
factors which do not contribute significantly to the overall
readiness of the unit.
d. Introduce reward systems, proficiency certificates,
and support competition to provide incentives.
e. Cancel or rewrite detailed regulations that un-
necessarily interfere with the question of how a problem should
be solved (that is the CO's mission). Rules that could actually
hamper realistic conduct of exercises directly or indirectly
ought to be put out of force since such directives could tend
to develop undesired, bureaucratic personality characteristics
n COs in addition to preventing them from properly acquiring
abilities and skills crucial to have in time of war.
Besides, due to the fact that Norway has universal con-
scription and the liberal values held by the general population,
special attention has to be paid to the development of the social
system of the unit. Therefore, it is recommended that the CO
and his officers should:
a. Acquire the basic view that the individual sailor
is a unique person with special needs to be satisfied.
b. Recognize the usefulness of a stepwise approach based
on time phases as described in Section IV D starting with
guadually introducing the new sailor to the unfamiliar en-
vironment of the frigate, and
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c. Be strongly encouraged to use all their innovative
abilities to create and implement participation and job rotation
programs which the sailors find meaningful and rewarding at the
same time as their efforts work to the benefit of the frigate.
However, within the frame of their legal power, it is both
the duty and the privilege of those selected to command ships
at sea, to find their own way. Only those who have the final
responsibility and authority can determine which recommendations




APPLYING THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CONTINGENCY MODELS
OF FIEDLER AND VROOM-YETTON
Traditionally it was common belief that some people were
born with special kinds of abilities that made them become
natural leaders . It was often supposed that these inherited
skills would allow such a person to perform equally well as
a leader in all situations. The consequences of this approach
is the view that mankind consists of two basic types of people:
r 37 "i
the leaders and the followers.
However, empirical results have shown that few people are
always leaders. The character of the role a person plays changes
Most people assume roles as leaders as well as followers. Re-
pairman Johnsen is in charge of no one at work, but on the
baseball field he is in command as the expert coach. Officers
who show up on practices accept Johnsen 's supervision and leader-
ship. This change of role is very well documented in literature.
Hence, today the prevailing point of view is that no single
leadership attribute assures good organizational performance
under all circumstances.
The problem of understanding the factors which affect
effective leadership has been approached from many directions
.
Hence, studies of personality trends, group behavior, sociology,
motivational structures, characteristics of organizations and
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the individuals and groups within them, and communication theory,
just to mention a few areas, have all contributed substantially
to the understanding of the leadership problem. Numerous
schemes have been developed to improve the performance of
leaders or to prepare future leaders. Often such efforts have
been combined with attempts to motivate workers to achieve
higher productivity applying various incentives.
In most cases, the approach has been partial. Experts in
different areas tend to emphasize their viewpoints as the most
valid ones. However, it seems that a model has to account for
a lot of facets if it intends to be successful in accounting
for all sides of leadership efficiency. Quite a few researchers
in this area have been interested in the effect of the dominant
motivation structure of leaders usually associated with needs
r To 71for achievement and needs of affiliation. L ' J Several have
T19 71found 1 ' J that the attitude the leader has towards achieving
his own goals as compared with those of the organization is an
important clue to understand leader behavior and efficiency.
The extreme values on the bipolar scale between achievement and
social needs motivators are usually referred to as task and
F191
relation orientation, respectively. J Many equivalent names
are commonly used to identify leaders belonging to one or the
other of these two categories such as "power orientation vs
.
personnel orientation" and "task specialization vs. maintenance
specialization" and several others.
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THE THEORY OF FIEDLER
One of the best known and validated theories of leadership
r 19 i
is F. Fxedler's contingency theory. Basically, Fiedler
uses a test to determine the leader's score on the task-relation
scale. This is very easily done by applying Fiedler's "least
preferred co-worker" (LPC) test. From a set consisting of all
present and former persons the subject ever worked with, he is
asked to pick the one he least preferred as a co-worker. Having
done this, the subject answers as best he can a list of attri-
butes concerning this person. Each question has to be indicated
on a scale with 1 and 8 as extremes. ' P* J When the scores
are summed, the subject's LPC index or score is obtained.
Fiedler classifies leaders in two main groups: (1) Subjects
who are not emotionally able to distinguish between attributes
of the co-worker related to poor work performance and qualities
describing the co-worker as an individual
,
gets a low LPC score
.
Those are the task oriented leaders. (2) Others who manage to
see the difference hetween the co-worker as a person and a
worker get high LPC scores . They are classified as relation
oriented and are characterized by being more analytical and
differential in perception and evaluation of their surrounding
environment.
Fiedler interprets the LPC index as an indicator of whether
a person's motivational hierarchy is basically achievement or
relation oriented. Furthermore, he presumes that the leader
not only pursues the goals of the organization, but also simul-
taneously tries to satisfy his own needs. Depending upon the
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structure of his motives and their relative priorities, the
approach to reach a certain goal may vary widely from leader
to leader.
The Contingency Model was developed by analyzing the data
regarding performance of different LPC score leaders in various
situations. The theory that emerged from this study lead to
the main hypothesis that effectiveness of leadership depends
upon:
a. the way the leader interacts with his group members
(style)
,
b. the characteristics of the group- task situation (favor-
ableness)
.
The following three factors were found to describe situation
favorableness
:
a. leader-member relations' (Good - Poor)
.
b. task structure (Structured - Unstructured)
.
c. leader position power (Strong - Weak)
In Figure 17, the correlation between combinations of these
three situation characteristics and leader performance, are
shown
.
Note that positive correlation indicates better performance
by high LPC score leaders, negative tells that the task-motivated
did the best job. As can be seen from the figure , the curves
representing the original and validation studies, respectively,
correspond pretty nicely. The correlation between them was
found to be .86. The results strongly suggest that task moti-























Correlation between leader LPC scores and performance in various
cells of the situational favorableness dimension. After Fiedler
from Fiedler and ClemersP 9 ' p " 84]
Good Good Good Good Poor Poor Poor Poor
Structured Unstructured Structured Unstructured
Strong Weak Strong Weak S trong Weak Strong Weak
situations, while relationship motivated leaders are found to do
best in moderately favorable situations.
The conclusion seems to be that the universally perfect
leader is rare, indeed. Interpreted another way, however, any-
body who is placed in a leadership situation that matches his
leadership style may excel given he has the necessary background
to fill the position. Because of the predictive power of the
contingency model, it seems reasonable to assume that a sub-
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stantial portion of the behavior pattern in leadership situa-
tions is determined by the person's LPC index.
r 3
1
We also know from other sources 1 J that there is a corre-
lation between leader style and leader efficiency in handling
different tasks. Therefore, it is a very crucial question
whether based upon continuous evaluation of the situation a
person is able to adjust his behavior at will to pursue the
goals he has set in the most rational way. Or does his behavior
change unintentionally as a result of group interactions and
hence outside his control?
It cannot be seen that Fiedler has investigated the con-
sistency between predicted leader style (expectations based on
LPC scores) and the behavior actually used by the leader in
different situations (based on observation) . Those with extreme
scores at both ends of the scale, supposingly, would behave
approximately as expected in accordance with their test results,
while those who obtain scores closer to the middle of the scale
might be anticipated to show greater flexibility and hence
variation in their leadership style.
Despite the fact that the LPC score predicts fairly well,
a lot of variation remains unexplained. One reasonable source
of explanation could be that Fiedler overestimated the rigidity
implied by the LPC index as a personality trait pattern. As
pointed out above, it seems quite intuitive to expect that
mature leaders in the middle range of LPC scores would tend to
adjust their leadership style or behavior to fit the situation.
r is i
It has been established through studies of group dynamics 1
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that effective output depends on a dual leadership principle.
An element of task orientation as well as a component taking
care of social needs of group members must be present to
insure efficient work. Most of the time, the leadership is
shared by two persons, one in charge of each aspect. It might
be hypothesized that an experienced leader will sense which
dimension is already taken care of and then adjust his behavior
to supply the missing part. If such flexibility is present,
efforts to train leaders and the importance of experience as
learning processes may be viewed a little more optimistically
in general than what Fiedler does. As pointed out by Fiedler,
the fact that high LPC scores in some instances tend to deter-
iorate in their leadership performance as they gain experience
may be explained by the fact that being fairly complex persons
cognitively, routine and power positions provide little challenge
and satisfaction to such individuals. Hence, when starting to
become bored, high LPC leaders should be transferred. The low
LPC type on the other hand, love to be on top of any detail, and
when every aspect is structured or he has no fear of failing
his goals, he can relax and become quite friendly.
Fiedler suggests that a leader should avoid situations where
he, according to his LPC score, cannot expect to perform at his
best. The weakness of this reasoning is the fact that most
leaders are required to face all kinds of situations in which
their positions demand that they act as leaders. Therefore, it
is much more appealing intuitively, to develop schemes to train
leaders to perform better in situations in which their usual
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style is known to be inefficient. To succeed in this task
requires development of two skills:
(1) enough insight to analyze the most important factors
of the situation, i.e., provide a reliable situation diagnosis,
(2) ability to adjust leadership style or behavior so as
to match the situation to improve the probability of obtaining
the goals the leader is working to accomplish.
T431Research 1 indicates that such flexibility may indeed be
present. In the military, the commanding officer and his
deputy usually (81% of the time in the presented survey) divide
the roles of the social-emotional leader and that of the task
leader between themselves. It seems like say, the captain of
a naval vessel indicates his interests and abilities and the
second-in-command fills in the holes necessary to provide a
complete leadership function. As we all may have seen, executive
officers change their role by substantial adjustments in behavior,
to match two different commanding officers. So the belief in
flexibility may have some merit after all.
Therefore, it does not seem justified to write off the
possibility that middle scorers of both categories may display
flexibility in adjusting their leadership style to match situa-
tional requirements. In fact, there is some evidence that
diagnostic methods are being used and that such insight has been
applied rationally or intuitively to perform optimally as leader
in the given circumstances
.
When looking at the different situations displayed by
octants in Figure 17, it would be rational for a moderately high
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LPC leader (relation-oriented) to show relatively autocratic
style in octant II. Since the task is structured, there is
not very much to disagree about. This may also partly explain
why the largest difference in median performance observed
between the original and validation studies occurred here
.
In octant VII, there is only a slight indication of variation
between categories. Since the situation attributes are poor,
unstructured, and strong, two main approaches seem logical:
1. The leader structures the problem if he has enough
information
.
2. If he lacks insight or information and the group has
the resources to solve the problem, he may have no choice but
delegate to the group to work out the solution. Despite poor
relations, such an assignment may turn out to provide an in-
centive for the group. Nevertheless, the leader has strong
powers so he can easily tighten the control if necessary.
Various explanations may supply reasonable answers to the
results obtained in octant VII, but assuming some leader style
flexibility in the middle range scores, leaders of both cate-
gories could equally well choose any one of the alternative
approaches outlined above. If this assumption holds, it is not
surprising that variation in observed behavior within LPC
category matches the variation between high and low LPC score
leaders
.
In summary, Fiedler's theory seems to suggest:
1. Assign leaders only to positions that match their po-
tential (according to LPC score), i.e., the leadership situations
they will experience are generally favorable.
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2. Educate leaders enough in relevant areas so as to
enable them to make situation diagnosis. From these two
approaches suggest themselves:
a. Share leadership responsibilities essentially along
a task function and a social-emotional function dividing line
(CO/XO)
.
b. Leadership by substitution. The responsible leader
assigns a subordinate assumed to possess the attributes the
situation requires, to carry out the leadership function on his
behalf. An example would be for a CO who is a poor shiphandler
to delegate to one of his officers to secure the vessel along
a pier.
Some of the conclusions that may be drawn from Fiedler's
work are:
a. High LPC leaders seem to need challenge to be
motivated. Hence, their performance may actually decrease with
experience. This indicates that such leaders should be watched
carefully and rotated when their performance starts to decline.
b. Low LPC leaders generally improve with experience.
Training also help them to manage their jobs better. Hence,
this type of leader should be kept in the same position for a
longer period.
c. Different organizational positions require different
skills. Structure tends to vary substantially with organiza-
tional level. This should be kept in mind such that a high LPC
person is not put in a very structured line supervisor position,





Next, we will look at another leadership theory of some
fame, the Vroom-Yetton Model. This theory provides a tool that
may be used for systematic diagnosis of a situation and subse-
quent choice of action.
The proposed procedure guarantees considerations about
choice of leadership style or rather the managerial decision
making approach to be used. It also takes into account relevant
demands for decision quality. Briefly stated, the model is
designed to determine which types of management decision process
it is suitable to use in varying situations. Each of the letters
"A" (Autocratic) , "C" (Consultative) , and "G" (Group) indicates
the basic properties of the process in question. Roman numerals
which follow the letters are attached to differentiate between
variants of the main approaches. As a conceptual aid to under-
stand the model, it is helpful to distinguish three main factors
which significantly influence the ultimate effectiveness of
decision. These are:
1. The quality or rationality of the decision.
2. The acceptance or commitment on the part of subordinates
to execute the decision effectively.
3. The amount of time required to make the decision.
In this context it is important to note that:
"The results suggest that allocating problem solving and
decision making tasks to entire groups, requires a greater
investment of man hours but produce higher acceptance of




The literature shows that the quality of the decisions
arrived at varies a lot between as well as within categories.
The same applies to the time used. Hence, it is not meaningful
to make general statements about relative merit of group work
as compared to individual effort in deriving adequate alterna-
tives and selecting efficient courses of action. Going back to
the Vroom-Yetton Model, its purpose is to assess the type of
process the leader should apply to insure the highest possibil-
ity of success. The specification must be based upon an eval-
uation of the situational demands. In Table II, a summary is
given of the codes and main features of the decison processes
included in the model (Vroom, Yogo, 1978, 52) .
Table II
TAXONOMY OF DECISION PROCESSES (STYLES)
Al - Decision maker (DM) decides himseif using only in-
formation presently available to him.
All - DM uses subordinates to obtain information, then
decides on the solution himself.
CI - DM shares problem with relevant subordinates in-
dividually, getting their ideas and suggestions,
but makes the final decision himself.
CII - DM shares the problem with the subordinates in a
group meeting to obtain suggestions and clarify
alternatives and consequences, but he still de-
termines what to do. The decision may or may not
reflect influence of his subordinates.
Gil - DM shares problems with his subordinates as a group.
The participants generate and evaluate alternatives
and aim at reaching concensus on a solution.
To find the recommenced process (or processes) in a particu-
lar case, the leader must first diagnose the problem. This is
done by answering yes or no to seven questions corresponding
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effectiveness of the different processes. The responses (yes
or no) describing the seven problem attributes, indicate the
problem type. Having obtained this information, the feasible
decision processes remaining are specified. The processes not
in the feasible set, are considered inapplicable to the problem
at hand. To use the model, one starts at the left side of
Figure 2 and goes towards the right asking the questions in
boxes A through G in the sequence they are encountered. Each
terminal node contains a code telling which process is described
for the problem type being investigated.
The seven rules underlying the diagnostic question are not
arbitrary. They are of two different types. The first three
rules are constructed as to protect the technical soundness of
the resulting decisions. These are called the leader informa-
tion rule, the goal congruence rule, and the unstructured
problem rule, respectively. The last four rules are intended
to protect the probability of acceptance of the decision.
r 52 1These can be summarized under the following headings
:
L J
- the acceptance rule,
- the conflict rule,
- the fairness rule,
- the acceptance priority rule.
In Table III, the problem types and the feasible set of
decision processes that correspond are listed. The number





PROBLEM TYPES AND THE FEASIBLE SET OF DECISION PROCESSES 2
Problem Type Acceptable Methods
1 AI, All, CI, CII, Gil
2 AI, All, CI, CII, Gil
3 Gil
4 AI, All, CI, CII, Gil




9 All, CI, CII, Gil*





*In the feasible set only when the answer to
question F is Yes. Note: Figure 2 explains
the number codes
.
2After Vroom from Kolb, Rubin and Mclntyre.^ ' p * *
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Whenever there are more than one method left in the feasi-
ble set, the choice among them might be done in any number of
ways. The decision tree in Figure 18 is based upon selecting
the one requiring minimum man-hours among methods of equally
likelihood to meet demands of decision standard. But other
criteria may be used as well. For example, if Gil belongs to
the feasible set, and the leader wants to develop his sub-
ordinates' ability to work in groups, he may go for this method.
The model has not been very well validated empirically.
The evidence presented in the earlier works of Vroom and Yetton
suffered from rather serious design deficiencies. However, in
[521
a recently published follow-up study, l J valid support for the
model is presented.
In addition to supplying evidence for the validity of the
Vroom-Yetton Model, the analysis of the data also yields other
interesting observations. In summary, some important findings
are:
a. When the decision method applied belongs to the feasible
set, the probability of successful result of the decision is
significantly higher than when the method used is not included.
b. Furthermore, decision method (ignoring feasible set)
employed can also predict decision success. CII and Gil are
found to be relatively effective overall (74% and 64% success
rates, respectively) . The results indicate that AI and CI are
comparatively ineffective (2 4% and 45% success rate) . This
finding supports those who point out the advantages of partici-
pation per se without regard to situational factors. ' p *
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However, the Vroom-Yetton Model has the additional discrimina-
tion capability of predicting those instances in which autocratic
leadership has a higher probability of success, as well as those
in which participative approaches will most certainly fail.
c. It should be pointed out that there is no guarantee of
success when a feasible method is used, or any certainty of
failure because the process applied is not contained in the
feasible set. But the probability of success varies considerably.
d. Generally, the relationship between decision process
used and resulting effectiveness of decision were found to be
consistent with the rules on which the Vroom-Yetton Model is




were found to decline substantially with number of rule viola-
tions. The degradations were almost linear with rate clearly




CONCLUDING REMARKS ABOUT THE VROOM-YETTON MODEL
It may be said that a lot of knowledge about human behavior
in group and organizations, human role playing and decision
making, motivations and many aspects of leadership are avail-
able today mostly in descriptive form. The Vroom-Yetton approach
seems quite promising in providing a normative bridge between
theory and practical life by integrating a lot of insight from
different areas of social sciences into this relatively simplistic
model. It is flexible and makes a lot of intuitive sense. The
result of the validation studies are encouraging. However, when
compared to the still much more thoroughly validated model of
Fiedler, a few crucial points need further investigation.
Efficient use of the Vroom-Yetton Model requires lots of flexi-
bility on behalf of the leader after he has acquired the
necessary diagnostic skills. From Fiedler's analysis, it seems
unreasonable to expect extremely high and low LPC scorers to
display any kind of efficiency in adopting different leadership
styles. But for the leaders in the intermediate range, the
Vroom-Yetton Model should provide a meaningful tool. Since
the method is like an algorithm in structure, it most certainly
should supply an excellent frame for analysis and discussions
of cases, and hence become an important element of support in




From Fiedler and other sources, we know as a fact that no-
body or at least very few, function equally well as leader under
all circumstances. This is not likely to change even if the
Vroom-Yetton Model proves to be close to perfect. However, the
diagnostic powers of this theory combined with knowledge of own
and subordinates* LPC score and experience, might enable say,
the commanding officer of a naval vessel to make choices in
leadership situations between more clearly understood alternatives
As shown before, this could include the decision to delegate
general authority in certain areas to his executive officer or
ordering one of his officers to perform certain duties as the
situation demands and the officer concerned has the required
skills.
Most certainly, neither Fiedler nor the others have found
the final truth of leadership. But combined, the two theories
discussed in this appendix provide insight as well as ideas that
may be utilized by any leader to experiment by trial and
error. Much deeper understanding and faster progress should
be obtained when a leadership philosophy is anchored to a well-
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